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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET
Wen Yao
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde
This thesis explores the important link between macroeconomic dynamics and the
nancial sector. The rst essay studies Epstein-Zin preferences, which are found to
be able to account for both aggregate macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices. In
the rst essay, I compare di¤erent solution methods for computing dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with Epstein-Zin preferences and stochastic
volatility. I show that perturbation methods are an attractive approach for comput-
ing this class of problems. The second essay emphasizes the importance of frictions in
the nancial market on real economic activities. The model studies the international
business cycle co-movements when nancial frictions are present. The model can
account for the positive and sizable cross-country correlations of output, investment
and hours worked in the data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
This thesis studies the connection between aggregate macroeconomic dynamics
and the nancial sector. Since the work by Mehra and Prescott (1985), it is well
known that standard real business cycle models have di¢ culty in explaining asset
prices. The introduction of recursive preferences, such as Epstein-Zin preferences
adds extra exibility and helps the model to explain asset pricing patterns. Given
the importance of Epstein-Zin preferences, the rst essay compares di¤erent solu-
tion methods for computing the equilibrium of DSGE models with Epstein and Zin
preferences and stochastic volatility. I solve the stochastic neoclassical growth model
with recursive preferences and stochastic volatility using four di¤erent approaches:
second- and third-order perturbation, Chebyshev polynomials, and value function it-
eration. I document the performance of the methods in terms of computing time,
implementation complexity, and accuracy. Our main nding is that perturbations
are competitive in terms of accuracy with Chebyshev polynomials and value function
iteration, while being several orders of magnitude faster to run. Therefore, I conclude
that perturbation methods are an attractive approach for computing this class of
problems.
The second essay looks into the importance of nancial frictions on real activi-
ties. I build a two-country DSGE model to study the quantitative impact of nancial
frictions on business cycle co-movements when investors have foreign asset exposure.
An investor in each country holds capital in both countries and faces a leverage con-
straint on her debt. I show quantitatively that nancial frictions along with foreign
asset exposure give rise to a multiplier e¤ect that amplies the transmission of shocks
between countries. The key mechanism is that a negative shock in the home country
reduces the wealth of investors in both countries which tightens their leverage con-
straints, leading to a fall in the investment, consumption, and hours worked in the
2
foreign country. Compared to the existing literature, which tends to produce either
negative or positive but small cross-country correlations, this model produces positive
and sizable correlations that are consistent with the data. The model can account
for two thirds of the output correlation, most of the employment correlation and a
positive investment correlation. In addition, the model also shows that, consistent
with empirical ndings, when investors have more foreign asset exposure in the other
country, the output correlation between the two countries increases.
3
Chapter 2
Computing DSGE Models with
Recursive Preferences and
Stochastic Volatility
4
2.1 Introduction
This paper compares di¤erent solution methods for computing the equilibrium of dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with recursive preferences and
stochastic volatility (SV). Both features have become very popular in nance and in
macroeconomics as modelling devices to account for business cycle uctuations and
asset pricing. Recursive preferences, as those rst proposed by Kreps and Porteus
(1978) and later generalized by Epstein and Zin (1989 and 1991) and Weil (1990), are
attractive for two reasons. First, they allow us to separate risk aversion and intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (EIS). Second, they o¤er the intuitive appeal of having
preferences for early or later resolution of uncertainty (see the reviews by Backus et
al., 2004 and 2007, and Hansen et al., 2007, for further details and references). SV
generates heteroskedastic aggregate uctuations, a basic property of many time series
such as output (see the review by Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2010),
and adds extra exibility in accounting for asset pricing patterns. In fact, in an inu-
ential paper, Bansal and Yaron (2004) have argued that the combination of recursive
preferences and SV is the key for their proposed mechanism, long-run risk, to be
successful at explaining asset pricing.
But despite the popularity and importance of these issues, nearly nothing is known
about the numerical properties of the di¤erent solution methods that solve equilibrium
models with recursive preferences and SV. For example, we do not know how well value
function iteration (VFI) performs or how good local approximations are compared
with global ones.1 Similarly, if we want to estimate the model, we need to assess which
solution method is su¢ ciently reliable yet quick enough to make the exercise feasible.
This paper attempts to ll this gap in the literature, and therefore, it complements
previous work by Aruoba et al. (2006), in which a similar exercise is performed with
the neoclassical growth model with CRRA utility function and constant volatility.
We solve and simulate the model using four main approaches: perturbation (of
second and third order), Chebyshev polynomials, and VFI. By doing so, we span most
of the relevant methods in the literature. Our results provide a strong guess of how
1Also, remember that the most common solution algorithm in the DSGE literature, (log-) lin-
earization, cannot be applied, since it makes us miss the whole point of recursive preferences or SV:
the resulting (log-) linear decision rules are certainty equivalent and do not depend on risk aversion
or volatility.
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some other methods not covered here, such as nite elements, would work (rather
similar to Chebyshev polynomials but more computationally intensive). We report
results for a benchmark calibration of the model and for alternative calibrations that
change the variance of the productivity shock, the risk aversion, and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. In that way, we study the performance of the methods both
for cases close to the CRRA utility function with constant volatility and for highly
non-linear cases far away from the CRRA benchmark. For each method, we compute
decision rules, the value function, the ergodic distribution of the economy, business
cycle statistics, the welfare costs of aggregate uctuations, and asset prices. Also, we
evaluate the accuracy of the solution by reporting Euler equation errors.
We highlight four main results from our exercise. First, all methods provide a high
degree of accuracy. Thus, researchers who stay within our set of solution algorithms
can be condent that their quantitative answers are sound.
Second, perturbations deliver a surprisingly high level of accuracy with consid-
erable speed. Both second- and third-order perturbations perform remarkably well
in terms of accuracy for the benchmark calibration, being competitive with VFI or
Chebyshev polynomials. For this calibration, a second-order perturbation that runs
in a fraction of a second does nearly as well in terms of the average Euler equation
error as a VFI that takes ten hours to run. Even in the extreme calibration with
high risk aversion and high volatility of productivity shocks, perturbation works at
a more than acceptable level. Since, in practice, perturbation methods are the only
computationally feasible method to solve the medium-scale DSGE models used for
policy analysis that have dozens of state variables (as in Smets and Wouters, 2007),
this nding has an outmost applicability. Moreover, since implementing second- and
third-order perturbations is feasible with o¤-the-shelf software like Dynare, which re-
quires minimum programming knowledge by the user, our ndings may induce many
researchers to explore recursive preferences and/or SV in further detail. Two nal
advantages of perturbation are that, often, the perturbed solution provides insights
about the economics of the problem and that it might be an excellent initial guess
for VFI or for Chebyshev polynomials.
Third, Chebyshev polynomials provide a terric level of accuracy with reasonable
computational burden. When accuracy is most required and the dimensionality of
the state space is not too high, as in our model, they are the obvious choice.
Fourth, we were disappointed by the poor performance of VFI, which, com-
6
pared with Chebyshev, could not achieve a high accuracy even with a large grid.
This suggests that we should relegate VFI to solving those problems where non-
di¤erentiabilities complicate the application of the previous methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our test
model. Section 3 describes the di¤erent solution methods used to approximate the
decision rules of the model. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the model. Section
5 reports numerical results and section 6 concludes. An appendix provides some
additional details.
2.2 The Stochastic Neoclassical GrowthModel with
Recursive Preferences and SV
We use the stochastic neoclassical growth model with recursive preferences and SV
in the process for technology as our test case. We select this model for three reasons.
First, it is the workhorse of modern macroeconomics. Even more complicated New
Keynesian models with real and nominal rigidities, such as those in Woodford (2003)
or Christiano et al. (2005), are built around the core of the neoclassical growth model.
Thus, any lesson learned with it is likely to have a wide applicability. Second, the
model is, except for the form of the utility function and the process for SV, the same
test case as in Aruoba et al. (2006). This provides us with a set of results to compare
to our ndings. Three, the introduction of recursive preferences and SV make the
model both more non-linear (and hence, a challenge for di¤erent solution algorithms)
and potentially more relevant for practical use. For example, and as mentioned in
the introduction, Bansal and Yaron (2004) have emphasized the importance of the
combination of recursive preferences and time-varying volatility to account for asset
prices.
The description of the model is straightforward, and we just go through the details
required to x notation. There is a representative household that has preferences over
streams of consumption, ct, and leisure, 1  lt, represented by a recursive function of
the form:
Ut = max
ct;lt

(1  )
 
ct (1  lt)
1  1  +   EtU1 t+1  1 1  (2.1)
The parameters in these preferences include ; the discount factor, , which controls
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labor supply, , which controls risk aversion, and:
 =
1  
1  1
 
where  is the EIS. The parameter  is an index of the deviation with respect to
the benchmark CRRA utility function (when  = 1, we are back in that CRRA case
where the inverse of the EIS and risk aversion coincide).
The households budget constraint is given by:
ct + it +
bt+1
Rft
= wtlt + rtkt + bt
where it is investment, R
f
t is the risk-free gross interest rate, bt is the holding of an
uncontingent bond that pays 1 unit of consumption good at time t+1, wt is the wage, lt
is labor, rt is the rental rate of capital, and kt is capital. Asset markets are complete
and we could have also included in the budget constraint the whole set of Arrow
securities. Since we have a representative household, this is not necessary because
the net supply of any security is zero. Households accumulate capital according to
the law of motion kt+1 = (1  )kt + it where  is the depreciation rate.
The nal good in the economy is produced by a competitive rm with a Cobb-
Douglas technology yt = eztk

t l
1 
t where zt is the productivity level that follows:
2
zt = zt 1 + e
t"t, "t  N (0; 1) :
The innovation "t is scaled by a SV level t; which evolves as:
t = (1  ) + t 1 + !t, !t  N (0; 1)
where  is the unconditional mean level of t,  is the persistence of the processes, and
 is the standard deviation of the innovations to t. Our specication is parsimonious
2Stationarity is the natural choice for our exercise. If we had a deterministic trend, we would
only need to adjust  in our calibration below (and the results would be nearly identical). If we had
a stochastic trend, we would need to rescale the variables by the productivity level and solve the
transformed problem. However, in this case, it is well known that the economy uctuates less than
when  < 1 , and therefore, all solution methods would be closer, limiting our ability to appreciate
di¤erences in their performance.
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and it introduces only two new parameters,  and . At the same time, it captures
some important features of the data (see a detailed discussion in Fernández-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ramírez, 2010). Another important point is that, with SV, we have two
innovations, an innovation to technology, "t; and an innovation to the standard de-
viation of technology, !t. Finally, the economy must satisfy the aggregate resource
constraint yt = ct + it.
The denition of equilibrium is standard and we skip it in the interest of space.
Also, both welfare theorems hold, a fact that we will exploit by jumping back and forth
between the solution of the social planners problem and the competitive equilibrium.
However, this is only to simplify our derivations. It is straightforward to adapt the
solution methods described below to solve problems that are not Pareto optimal.
Thus, an alternative way to write this economy is to look at the value function
representation of the social planners problem in terms of its three state variables,
capital kt, productivity zt, and volatility, t:
V (kt; zt; t) = max
ct;lt

(1  )
 
ct (1  lt)
1  1  +   EtV 1  (kt+1; zt+1; t+1) 1 1 
s.t. ct + kt+1 = eztk

t l
1 
t + (1  ) kt
zt = zt 1 + e
t"t, "t  N (0; 1)
t = (1  ) + t 1 + !t, !t  N (0; 1) :
Then, we can nd the pricing kernel of the economy
mt+1 =
@Vt=@ct+1
@Vt=@ct
:
Now, note that:
@Vt
@ct
= (1  )V 1 
1 

t 
(ct (1  lt)1 )
1 

ct
and:
@Vt
@ct+1
= V
1  1 

t (EtV
1 
t+1 )
1

 1Et
 
V  t+1 (1  )V
1  1 

t+1 
(1  ) (ct+1(1  lt+1)1 )
1 

ct+1
!
where in the last step we use the result regarding @Vt=@ct forwarded by one period.
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Cancelling redundant terms, we get:
mt+1 =
@Vt=@ct+1
@Vt=@ct
= 

ct+1(1  lt+1)1 
ct (1  lt)1 
 1 
 ct
ct+1
 
V 1 t+1
EtV 1 t+1
!1  1

: (2.2)
This equation shows how the pricing kernel is a¤ected by the presence of recursive
preferences. If  = 1, the last term,
 
V 1 t+1
EtV 1 t+1
!1  1

(2.3)
is equal to 1 and we get back the pricing kernel of the standard CRRA case. If  6= 1,
the pricing kernel is twisted by (2.3).
We identify the net return on equity with the marginal net return on investment:
Rkt+1 = e
zt+1k 1t+1 l
1 
t+1   
with expected return Et

Rkt+1

:
2.3 Solution Methods
We are interested in comparing di¤erent solution methods to approximate the dynam-
ics of the previous model. Since the literature on computational methods is large,
it would be cumbersome to review every proposed method. Instead, we select those
methods that we nd most promising.
Our rst method is perturbation (introduced by Judd and Guu, 1992 and 1997 and
nicely explained in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004). Perturbation algorithms build a
Taylor series expansion of the agentsdecision rules. Often, perturbation methods are
very fast and, despite their local nature, highly accurate in a large range of values of
the state variables (Aruoba et al., 2006). This means that, in practice, perturbations
are the only method that can handle models with dozens of state variables within any
reasonable amount of time. Moreover, perturbation often provides insights into the
structure of the solution and on the economics of the model. Finally, linearization and
log-linearization, the most common solution methods for DSGEmodels, are particular
cases of a perturbation of rst order.
10
We implement a second- and a third-order perturbation of our model. A rst-
order perturbation is useless for our investigation: the resulting decision rules are
certainty equivalent and, therefore, they depend on  but not on  or t. In other
words, the rst-order decision rules of the model with recursive preferences coincide
with the decision rules of the model with CRRA preferences with the same  and 
for any value of  or t. We need to go, at least, to second-order decision rules to have
terms that depend on  or t and, hence, allow recursive preferences or SV to play a
role. Since the accuracy of second-order decision rules may not be high enough and,
in addition, we want to explore time-varying risk premia, we also compute a third-
order perturbation. As we will document below, a third-order perturbation provides
enough accuracy without unnecessary complications. Thus, we do not need to go to
higher orders.
The second method is a projection algorithm with Chebyshev polynomials (Judd,
1992). Projection algorithms build approximated decision rules that minimize a resid-
ual function that measures the distance between the left- and right-hand side of the
equilibrium conditions of the model. Projection methods are attractive because they
o¤er a global solution over the whole range of the state space. Their main drawback
is that they su¤er from an acute curse of dimensionality that makes it challenging
to extend it to models with many state variables. Among the many di¤erent types
of projection methods, Aruoba et al. (2006) show that Chebyshev polynomials are
particularly e¢ cient. Other projection methods, such as nite elements or parame-
terized expectations, tend to perform somewhat worse than Chebyshev polynomials,
and therefore, in the interest of space, we do not consider them.
Finally, we compute the model using VFI (Epstein and Zin, 1989, show that
a version of the contraction mapping theorem holds in the value function of the
problem with recursive preferences). VFI is slow and it su¤ers as well from the curse
of dimensionality, but it is safe, reliable, and well understood. Thus, it is a natural
default algorithm for the solution of DSGE models.
2.3.1 Perturbation
We describe now each of the di¤erent methods in more detail. We start by explaining
how to use a perturbation approach to solve DSGE models using the value function of
the household. We are not the rst to explore the perturbation of value function prob-
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lems. Judd (1998) already presents the idea of perturbing the value function instead
of the equilibrium conditions of a model. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate much
on the topic. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) employ a perturbation approach to
nd a second-order approximation to the value function that allows them to rank dif-
ferent scal and monetary policies in terms of welfare. However, we follow Binsbergen
et al. (2009) in their emphasis on the generality of the approach.3
To illustrate the procedure, we limit our exposition to deriving the second-order
approximation to the value function and the decision rules of the agents. Higher-
order terms are derived analogously, but the algebra becomes too cumbersome to
be developed explicitly (in our application, the symbolic algebra is undertaken by
Mathematica, which automatically generates Fortran 95 code that we can evaluate
numerically). Hopefully, our steps will be enough to allow the reader to understand
the main thrust of the procedure and obtain higher-order approximations by herself.
First, we rewrite the exogenous processes in terms of a perturbation parameter ,
zt = zt 1 + e
t"t
t = (1  ) + t 1 + !t:
When  = 1, which is just a normalization, we are dealing with the stochastic version
of the model. When  = 0, we are dealing with the deterministic case with steady
state kss, zss = 0, and ss = . Also, it is convenient for the algebra below to dene
a vector of states in di¤erences with respect to the steady state:
st = (kt   kss; zt 1; "t; t 1   ss; !t; )
where sit is the i   th component of this vector at time t for i 2 f1; : : : ; 6g. Then,
we can write the social planners value function, V (st), and the decision rules for
3The perturbation method is related to Benigno and Woodford (2006) and Hansen and Sargent
(1995). Benigno and Woodford present a linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation to solve optimal
policy problems when the constraints of the problem are non-linear (see also Levine et al., 2007).
This allows them to nd the correct local welfare ranking of di¤erent policies. Our perturbation
can also deal with non-linear constraints and obtains the correct local approximation to welfare
and policies, but with the advantage that it is easily generalizable to higher-order approximations.
Hansen and Sargent (1995) modify the LQ problem to adjust for risk. In that way, they can handle
some versions of recursive utilities. Hansen and Sargents method, however, requires imposing a
tight functional form for future utility and to surrender the assumption that risk-adjusted utility is
separable across states of the world. Perturbation does not su¤er from those limitations.
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consumption, c (st), investment, i (st), capital, k (st), and labor, l (st), as a function
of st.
Second, we note that, under di¤erentiability assumptions, the second-order Taylor
approximation of the value function around st = 0 (the vectorial zero) is:
V (st) ' Vss + Vi;sssit +
1
2
Vij;sss
i
ts
j
t
where:
1. Each term V:::;ss is a scalar equal to a derivative of the value function evaluated
at 0: Vss  V (0) ; Vi;ss  Vi (0) for i 2 f1; : : : ; 6g ; and Vij;ss  Vij (0) for
i; j 2 f1; : : : ; 6g ;
2. We use the tensors Vi;sssit =
P6
i=1 Vi;sssi;t and Vij;sss
i
ts
j
t =
P6
i=1
P6
i=1 Vij;sssi;tsj;t,
which eliminate the symbol
P6
i=1 when no confusion arises.
We can extend this notation to higher-order derivatives of the value function. This
expansion could also be performed around a di¤erent point of the state space, such
as the mode of the ergodic distribution of the state variables. In section 5, we discuss
this point further.
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010) show that many of these terms V:::;ss are zero
(for instance, those implied by certainty equivalence in the rst-order component).
More directly related to this paper, Binsbergen et al. (2009) demonstrate that  does
not a¤ect the values of any of the coe¢ cients except V66;ss and also that V66;ss 6= 0.
This result is intuitive, since the value function of a risk-averse agent is in general
a¤ected by uncertainty and we want to have an approximation with terms that capture
this e¤ect and allow for the appropriate welfare ranking of decision rules. Indeed, V66;ss
has a straightforward interpretation. At the deterministic steady state with  = 1
(that is, even if we are in the stochastic economy, we just happen to be exactly at the
steady state values of all the other states), we have:
V (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1) ' Vss +
1
2
V66;ss
Hence 1
2
V66;ss is a measure of the welfare cost of the business cycle, that is, of how
much utility changes when the variance of the productivity shocks is at steady-state
value ss instead of zero (note that this quantity is not necessarily negative). This
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term is an accurate evaluation of the third order of the welfare cost of business
cycle uctuations because all of the third-order terms in the approximation of the
value function either have coe¢ cient values of zero or drop when evaluated at the
deterministic steady state.
This cost of the business cycle can easily be transformed into consumption equiv-
alent units. We can compute the percentage decrease in consumption  that will
make the household indi¤erent between consuming (1  ) css units per period with
certainty or ct units with uncertainty. To do so, note that the steady-state value
function is just Vss = css (1  lss)
1  ; which implies that:
css (1  lss)
1  +
1
2
V66;ss = ((1  ) css) (1  lss)1 
or:
Vss +
1
2
V66;ss = (1  ) Vss
Then:
 = 1 

1 +
1
2
V66;ss
Vss
 1

:
We are perturbing the value function in levels of the variables. However, there
is nothing special about levels and we could have done the same in logs (a com-
mon practice when linearizing DSGE models) or in any other function of the states.
These changes of variables may improve the performance of perturbation (Fernández-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2006). By doing the perturbation in levels, we are
picking the most conservative case for perturbation. Since one of the conclusions that
we will reach from our numerical results is that perturbation works surprisingly well
in terms of accuracy, that conclusion will only be reinforced by an appropriate change
of variables.4
The decision rules can be expanded in the same way. For example, the second-
order approximation of the decision rule for consumption is, under di¤erentiability
4This comment begets the question, nevertheless, of why we did not perform a perturbation in
logs, since many economists will nd it more natural than using levels. Our experience with the
CRRA utility case (Aruoba et al., 2006) and some computations with recursive preferences not
included in the paper suggest that a perturbation in logs does slightly worse than a perturbation in
levels.
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assumptions:
c (st) ' css + ci;sssit +
1
2
cij;sss
i
ts
j
t
where we have followed the same derivative and tensor notation as before.
As with the approximation of the value function, Binsbergen et al. (2009) show
that  does not a¤ect the values of any of the coe¢ cients except c66;ss. This term
is a constant that captures precautionary behavior caused by risk. This observation
tells us two facts. First, a linear approximation to the decision rule does not de-
pend on  (it is certainty equivalent), and therefore, if we are interested in recursive
preferences, we need to go at least to a second-order approximation. Second, given
some xed parameter values, the di¤erence between the second-order approximation
to the decision rules of a model with CRRA preferences and a model with recursive
preferences is a constant. This constant generates a second, indirect e¤ect, because
it changes the ergodic distribution of the state variables and, hence, the points where
we evaluate the decision rules along the equilibrium path. These arguments demon-
strate how perturbation methods can provide analytic insights beyond computational
advantages and help in understanding the numerical results in Tallarini (2000). In
the third-order approximation, all of the terms on functions of 2 depend on .
Following the same steps, we can derive the decision rules for labor, investment,
and capital. In addition we have functions that give us the evolution of other variables
of interest, such as the pricing kernel or the risk-free gross interest rateRft . All of these
functions have the same structure and properties regarding  as the decision rule for
consumption. In the case of functions pricing assets, the second-order approximation
generates a constant risk premium, while the third-order approximation creates a
time-varying risk premium.
Once we have reached this point, there are two paths we can follow to solve
for the coe¢ cients of the perturbation. The rst procedure is to write down the
equilibrium conditions of the model plus the denition of the value function. Then, we
take successive derivatives in this augmented set of equilibrium conditions and solve
for the unknown coe¢ cients. This approach, which we call equilibrium conditions
perturbation (ECP), gets us, after n iterations, the n-th-order approximation to the
value function and to the decision rules.
A second procedure is to take derivatives of the value function with respect to
states and controls and use those derivatives to nd the unknown coe¢ cient. This
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approach, which we call value function perturbation (VFP), delivers after (n+ 1)
steps, the (n+ 1)-th order approximation to the value function and the n th order
approximation to the decision rules.5 Loosely speaking, ECP undertakes the rst step
of VFP by hand by forcing the researcher to derive the equilibrium conditions.
The ECP approach is simpler but it relies on our ability to nd equilibrium con-
ditions that do not depend on derivatives of the value function. Otherwise, we need
to modify the equilibrium conditions to include the denitions of the derivatives of
the value function. Even if this is possible to do (and not particularly di¢ cult), it
amounts to solving a problem that is equivalent to VFP. This observation is impor-
tant because it is easy to postulate models that have equilibrium conditions where
we cannot get rid of all the derivatives of the value function (for example, in prob-
lems of optimal policy design). ECP is also faster from a computational perspective.
However, VFP is only trivially more involved because nding the (n+ 1)-th-order
approximation to the value function on top of the n-th order approximation requires
nearly no additional e¤ort.
The algorithm presented here is based on the system of equilibrium equations
derived using the ECP. In the appendix, we derive a system of equations using the
VFP. We take the rst-order conditions of the social planner. First, with respect to
consumption today:
@Vt
@ct
  t = 0
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraint. Second,
with respect to capital:
 t + Ett+1

ezt+1k 1t+1 l
1 
t+1 + 1  

= 0:
Third, with respect to labor:
1  

ct
(1  lt)
= (1  )eztkt l t :
Then, we have Etmt+1

eztk 1t+1 l
1 
t+1 + 1  

= 1 wheremt+1 was derived in equation
5The classical strategy of nding a quadratic approximation of the utility function to derive a lin-
ear decision rule is a second-order example of VFP (Anderson et al., 1996). A standard linearization
of the equilibrium conditions of a DSGE model when we add the value function to those equilibrium
conditions is a simple case of ECP. This is done, for instance, in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005).
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(2.2). Note that, as explained above, the derivatives of the value function in (2.2) are
eliminated.
Once we substitute for the pricing kernel, the augmented equilibrium conditions
are:
Vt  

(1  )
 
ct (1  lt)
1  1  +   EtV 1  (kt+1; zt+1) 1 1  = 0
Et
24 ct+1
ct
 1 

 1
 
V 1 t+1
EtV 1 t+1
!1  1
 
ezt+1k 1t+1 l
1 
t+1 + 1  
35  1 = 0
1  

ct
(1  lt)
= (1  )eztkt l t = 0
Et

ct+1
ct
 1 

 1
 
V 1 t+1
EtV 1 t+1
!1  1

Rft   1 = 0
ct + it   eztkt l1 t = 0
kt+1   it   (1  ) kt = 0
plus the law of motion for productivity and volatility. Note that all the endogenous
variables are functions of the states and that we drop the max operator in front of the
value function because we are already evaluating it at the optimum. Thus, a more
compact notation for the previous equilibrium conditions as a function of the states
is:
F (0) = 0
where F : R6 ! R8.
In steady state, mss =  and the set of equilibrium conditions simplies to:
Vss = c

ss (1  lss)
1  
k 1ss l
1 
ss + 1  

= 1=
1  

css
(1  lss)
= (1  )kssl ss
Rfss = 1=
css + iss = k

ssl
1 
ss
iss = kss
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a system of 6 equations on 6 unknowns, Vss, css, kss, iss, lss, and Rfss that can be easily
solved (see the appendix for the derivations). This steady state is identical to the
steady state of the real business cycle model with a standard CRRA utility function
and no SV.
To nd the rst-order approximation to the value function and the decision rules,
we take rst derivatives of the function F with respect to the states st and evaluate
them at 0:
Fi (0) = 0 for i 2 f1; : : : ; 6g :
This step gives us 48 di¤erent rst derivatives (8 equilibrium conditions times the 6
variables of F ). Since each dimension of F is equal to zero for all possible values of
st, their derivatives must also be equal to zero. Therefore, once we substitute the
steady-state values and forget about the exogenous processes (which we do not need
to solve for), we have a quadratic system of 36 equations on 36 unknowns: Vi;ss, ci;ss,
ii;ss, ki;ss, li;ss, and R
f
i;ss for i 2 f1; : : : ; 6g : One of the solutions is an unstable root of
the system that violates the transversality condition of the problem and we eliminate
it. Thus, we keep the solution that implies stability.
To nd the second-order approximation, we take derivatives on the rst derivatives
of the function F , again with respect to the states and the perturbation parameter:
Fij (0) = 0 for i; j 2 f1; : : : ; 6g :
This step gives us a new system of equations. Then, we plug in the terms that we
already know from the steady state and from the rst-order approximation and we get
that the only unknowns left are the second-order terms of the value function and other
functions of interest. Quite conveniently, this system of equations is linear and it can
be solved quickly. Repeating these steps (taking higher-order derivatives, plugging
in the terms already known, and solving for the remaining unknowns), we can get
any arbitrary order approximation. For simplicity, and since we checked that we were
already obtaining a high accuracy, we decided to stop at a third-order approximation
(we are particularly interested in applying the perturbation for estimation purposes
and we want to document how a third-order approximation is accurate enough for
many problems without spending too much time deriving higher-order terms).
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2.3.2 Projection
Projection methods take basis functions to build an approximated value function and
decision rules that minimize a residual function dened by the augmented equilibrium
conditions of the model. There are two popular methods for choosing basis functions:
nite elements and the spectral method. We will present only the spectral method
for several reasons: rst, in the neoclassical growth model the decision rules and
value function are smooth and spectral methods provide an excellent approximation.
Second, spectral methods allow us to use a large number of basis functions, with the
consequent high accuracy. Third, spectral methods are easier to implement. Their
main drawback is that since they approximate the solution with a spectral basis, if the
decision rules display a rapidly changing local behavior or kinks, it may be di¢ cult
for this scheme to capture those local properties.
Our target is to solve the decision rule for labor and the value function flt; Vtg
from the two conditions:
H(lt; Vt) =
264 uc;t   

EtV 1 t+1
 1

 1
Et

V
(1 )( 1)

t+1 uc;t+1

ezt+1k 1t+1 l
1 
t+1 + 1  

Vt  
h
(1  )(ct (1  lt ))
1 
 + Et(V 1 t+1 )
1

i 
1 
375 = 0
where, to save on notation, we dene Vt = V (kt; zt; t) and:
uc;t =
1  


 
ct (1  lt)
1  1 
ct
Then, from the static condition
ct =

1   (1  )e
ztkt l
 
t (1  lt)
and the resource constraint, we can nd ct and kt+1.
Spectral methods solve this problem by specifying the decision rule for labor and
the value function flt; Vtg as linear combinations of weighted basis functions:
l(kt; zj; m; ) = i
l
ijm i(kt)
V (kt; zj; m; ) = i
V
ijm i(kt)
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where f i(k)gi=1;:::;nk are the nk basis functions that we will use for our approximation
along the capital dimension and  = flijm; Vijmgi=1;:::;nk;j=1;:::;J ;m=1;::;M are unknown
coe¢ cients to be determined. In this expression, we have discretized the stochastic
processes t for volatility and zt for productivity using Tauchens (1986) method
as follows. First, we have a grid of M points G = fe1 ; e2; :::; eMg for t and a
transition matrix M with generic element Mi;j = Prob (e
t+1 = ej jet = ei). The
grid covers 3 standard deviations of the process in each direction. Then, for each M
point, we nd a grid with J pointsGmz = fzm1 ; zm2 ; :::; zmJ g for zt and transition matrixes
J;m with generic element J;mi;j = Prob
 
zmt+1 = z
m
j jzmt = zmi

. Again, and conditional
on em, the grid covers 3 standard deviations in each direction. Values for the decision
rule outside the grids G and Gmz can be approximated by interpolation. We make
the grids for zt depend on the level of volatility m to adapt the accuracy of Tauchens
procedure to each conditional variance (although this forces us to interpolate when
we switch variances). Since we set J = 25 and M = 5; the approximation is quite
accurate along the productivity axis (we explored other choices of J and M to be
sure that our choice was sensible).
A common choice for the basis functions are Chebyshev polynomials because of
their exibility and convenience. Since their domain is [-1,1], we need to bound
capital to the set [k; k], where k (k) is chosen su¢ ciently low (high) to bind only
with extremely low probability, and dene a linear map from those bounds into [-1,1].
Then, we set  i(kt) = e i(k(kt)) where e i() are Chebyshev polynomials and k(kt)
is the linear mapping from [k; k] to [-1,1].
By plugging l(kt; zj; m; ) and V (kt; zj; m; ) into H(lt; Vt), we nd the residual
function:
R(kt; zj; m; ) = H(l(kt; zj; m; ); V (kt; zj; m; ))
We determine the coe¢ cients  to get the residual function as close to 0 as possible.
However, to do so, we need to choose a weight of the residual function over the
space (kt; zj; m). A collocation point criterion delivers the best trade-o¤ between
speed and accuracy (Fornberg, 1998) by making the residual function exactly equal
to zero in fkignki=1 roots of the nk-th order Chebyshev polynomial and in the Tauchen
points (also, by the Chebyshev interpolation theorem, if an approximating function
is exact at the roots of the nk th order Chebyshev polynomial, then, as nk ! 1,
the approximation error becomes arbitrarily small). Therefore, we just need to solve
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the following system of nk  J M  2 equations:
R(ki; zj; m; ) = 0 for any i; j;m collocation points
on nk J M  2 unknowns . We solve this system with a Newton method and an
iteration based on the increment of the number of basis functions. First, we solve a
system with only three collocation points for capital and 125 (125 = 255) points for
technology. Then, we use that solution as a guess for a system with more collocation
points for capital (with the new coe¢ cients being guessed to be equal to zero) and
iterate on the procedure. We stop the iteration when we have 11 polynomials in the
capital dimension (therefore, in the last step we solve for 2; 750 = 11  25  5  2
coe¢ cients). The iteration is needed because otherwise the residual function is too
cumbersome to allow for direct solution of the 2; 750 nal coe¢ cients.
2.3.3 Value Function Iteration
Our nal solution method is VFI. Since the dynamic algorithm is well known, our
presentation is most brief. Consider the following Bellman operator:
TV (kt; zt; t) = max
ct;lt

(1  )
 
ct (1  lt)
1  1  +   EtV 1  (kt+1; zt+1; t+1) 1 1 
s.t. ct + kt+1 = eztk

t l
1 
t + (1  ) kt
zt = zt 1 + e
t"t, "t  N (0; 1)
t = (1  ) + t 1 + !t, !t  N (0; 1) :
To solve for this Bellman operator, we dene a grid on capital, Gk = fk1; k2; :::; kMg,
a grid on volatility and on the productivity level. The grid on capital is just a uniform
distribution of points over the capital dimension. As we did for projection, we set
a grid G = fe1 ; e2; :::; eMg for t and a transition matrix M for volatility and
M grids Gmz = fzm1 ; zm2 ; :::; zmJ g for zt and transition matrixes J;m using Tauchens
(1986) procedure. The algorithm to iterate on the value function for this grid is:
1. Set n = 0 and V 0(kt; zt; t) = css (1  lss)
1  for all kt 2 Gk and all zt 2 Gz.
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2. For every fkt; zt; tg; use the Newton method to nd ct , lt , kt+1 that solve:
ct =

1   (1  )e
ztkt l
 
t (1  lt)
(1  ) 
 
ct (1  lt)
1  1 
ct
= 

Et
 
V nt+1
1  1 1 Et h V nt+1  V n1;t+1i
ct + kt+1 = e
ztkt l
1 
t + (1  )kt
3. Construct V n+1 from the Bellman equation:
V n+1 = ((1  )(ct (1  lt )1 )
1 
 + (Et(V (kt+1; zt+1; t+1)1 ))
1
 )

1 
4. If jV
n+1 V nj
jV nj  1:0e
 7, then n = n+ 1 and go to 2. Otherwise, stop.
To accelerate convergence and give VFI a fair chance, we implement a multigrid
scheme as described by Chow and Tsitsiklis (1991). We start by iterating on a small
grid. Then, after convergence, we add more points to the grid and recompute the
Bellman operator using the previously found value function as an initial guess (with
linear interpolation to ll the unknown values in the new grid points). Since the
previous value function is an excellent grid, we quickly converge in the new grid.
Repeating these steps several times, we move from an initial 23,000-point grid into a
nal one with 375,000 points (3,000 points for capital, 25 for productivity, and 5 for
volatility).
2.4 Calibration
We now select a benchmark calibration for our numerical computations. We follow
the literature as closely as possible and select parameter values to match, in the
steady state, some basic observations of the U.S. economy (as we will see below, for
the benchmark calibration, the means of the ergodic distribution and the steady-
state values are nearly identical). We set the discount factor  = 0:991 to generate
an annual interest rate of around 3.6 percent. We set the parameter that governs
labor supply, = 0:357, to get the representative household to work one-third of its
time. The elasticity of output to capital,  = 0:3; matches the labor share of national
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income. A value of the depreciation rate  = 0:0196 matches the ratio of investment-
output. Finally,  = 0:95 and log  = 0:007 are standard values for the stochastic
properties of the Solow residual. For the SV process, we pick  = 0:9 and  = 0:06;
to match the persistence and standard deviation of the heteroskedastic component of
the Solow residual during the last 5 decades.
Since we want to explore the dynamics of the model for a range of values that
encompasses all the estimates from the literature, we select four values for the pa-
rameter that controls risk aversion, , 2, 5, 10, and 40, and two values for EIS  ,
0.5, and 1.5, which bracket most of the values used in the literature (although many
authors prefer smaller values for  , we found that the simulation results for smaller
 s do not change much from the case when  = 0:5). We then compute the model for
all eight combinations of values of  and  , that is f2; 0:5g, f5; 0:5g, f10; 0:5g, and so
on. When  = 0:5 and  = 2, we are back in the standard CRRA case. However, in
the interest of space, we will report only a limited subset of results that we nd are
the most interesting ones.
We pick as the benchmark case the calibration f;  ; log ; g = f5; 0:5; 0:007; 0:06g.
These values reect an EIS centered around the median of the estimates in the litera-
ture, a reasonably high level of risk aversion, and the observed volatility of productiv-
ity shocks. To check robustness, we increase, in the extreme case, the risk aversion,
the average standard deviation of the productivity shock, and the standard deviation
of the innovations to volatility to f;  ; log ; g = f40; 0:5; 0:021; 0:1g. This case
combines levels of risk aversion that are in the upper bound of all estimates in the
literature with huge productivity shocks. Therefore, it pushes all solution methods to
their limits, in particular, making life hard for perturbation since the interaction of
the large precautionary behavior induced by  and large shocks will move the econ-
omy far away from the deterministic steady state. We leave the discussion of the
e¤ects of  = 1:5 for the robustness analysis at the end of the next section.
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section we report our numerical ndings. First, we present and discuss the
computed decision rules. Second, we show the results of simulating the model. Third,
we report the Euler equation errors. Fourth, we discuss the e¤ects of changing the
EIS and the perturbation point. Finally, we discuss implementation and computing
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time.
2.5.1 Decision Rules
One of our rst results is the decision rules and the value function of the agent.
Figure 2.1 plots the decision rules for consumption, labor supply, capital, and the
value function in the benchmark case when zt = 0 and t =  computed over a
capital interval centered on the steady-state level of capital of 9.54 with a width of
40%; [5.72,13.36]. We selected an interval for capital big enough to encompass all
the simulations in our sample. Similar gures could be plotted for other values of zt
and t. We omit them because of space considerations.
Since all methods provide nearly indistinguishable answers, we observe only one
line in all gures. It is possible to appreciate very tiny di¤erences in labor supply
between second-order perturbation and the other methods only when capital is far
from its steady-state level. Monotonicity of the decision rules is preserved by all
methods. We must be cautious, however, mapping di¤erences in choices into di¤er-
ences in utility. The Euler error function below provides a better view of the welfare
consequences of di¤erent approximations.
We see bigger di¤erences in the decision rules and value functions as we increase
the risk aversion and the variance of innovations. Figure 2.2 plots the decision rules
and value functions for the extreme calibration. In this gure, we change the interval
where we compute our decision rules to [3,32] (roughly 1/3 and 3 times the steady-
state capital) because, owing to the high variance of the calibration, the equilibrium
paths uctuate through much wider ranges of capital.
We highlight several results. First, all the methods deliver similar results in our
original interval for the benchmark calibration. Second, as we go far away from
the steady state, VFI and the Chebyshev polynomial still overlap with each other
(and, as shown by our Euler error computations below, we can roughly take them as
the exact solution), but second- and third-order approximations start to deviate.
Third, the decision rule for consumption and the value function approximated by the
third-order perturbation changes from concavity into convexity for values of capital
bigger than 15. This phenomenon (also documented in Aruoba et al. 2006) is due to
the poor performance of local approximation when we move too far away from the
expansion point and the polynomials begin to behave wildly. In any case, this issue
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is irrelevant because, as we will show below, the problematic region is visited with
nearly zero probability.
2.5.2 Simulations
Applied economists often characterize the behavior of the model through statistics
from simulated paths of the economy. We simulate the model, starting from the
deterministic steady state, for 10,000 periods, using the decision rules for each of the
eight combinations of risk aversion and EIS discussed above. To make the comparison
meaningful, the shocks are common across all paths. We discard the rst 1,000 periods
as a burn-in to eliminate the transition from the deterministic steady state of the
model to the middle regions of the ergodic distribution of capital. This is usually
achieved in many fewer periods than the ones in our burn-in, but we want to be
conservative in our results. The remaining observations constitute a sample from the
ergodic distribution of the economy.
For the benchmark calibration, the simulations from all of the solution methods
generate almost identical equilibrium paths (and therefore we do not report them).
We focus instead on the densities of the endogenous variables as shown in gure
3. Given the low risk aversion and SV of the productivity shocks, all densities are
roughly centered around the deterministic steady-state value of the variable. For
example, the mean of the distribution of capital is only 0.2 percent higher than the
deterministic value. Also, capital is nearly always between 8.5 and 10.5. This range
will be important below to judge the accuracy of our approximations.
Table 2.2 reports business cycle statistics and, because DSGE models with recur-
sive preferences and SV are often used for asset pricing, the average and variance
of the (quarterly) risk-free rate and return on capital. Again, we see that nearly all
values are the same, a simple consequence of the similarity of the decision rules.
The welfare cost of the business cycle is reported in table 2.3 in consumption
equivalent terms. The computed costs are actually negative. Besides the Jensens
e¤ect on average productivity, this is also due to the fact that when we have leisure
in the utility function, the indirect utility function may be convex in input prices
(agents change their behavior over time by a large amount to take advantage of
changing productivity). Cho and Cooley (2000) present a similar example. Welfare
costs are comparable across methods. Remember that the welfare cost of the business
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cycle for the second- and third-order perturbations is the same because the third-order
terms all drop or are zero when evaluated at the steady state.
When we move to the extreme calibration, we see more di¤erences. Figure 2.4
plots the histograms of the simulated series for each solution method. Looking at
quantities, the histograms of consumption, output, and labor are the same across all
of the methods. The ergodic distribution of capital puts nearly all the mass between
values of 6 and 15. This considerable move to the right in comparison with gure 3
is due to the e¤ect of precautionary behavior in the presence of high risk aversion,
large productivity shocks, and high SV. Capital also visits low values of capital more
than in the benchmark calibration because of large, persistent productivity shocks.
In any case, the translation is more pronounced to the right than to the left.
Table 2.4 reports business cycle statistics. Di¤erences across methods are mi-
nor in terms of means (note that the mean of the risk-free rate is lower than in the
benchmark calibration because of the extra accumulation of capital induced by pre-
cautionary behavior). In terms of variances, the second-order perturbation produces
less volatility than all other methods. This suggests that a second-order perturbation
may not be good enough if we face high variance of the shocks and/or high risk aver-
sion. A third-order perturbation, in comparison, eliminates most of the di¤erences
and delivers nearly the same implications as Chebyshev polynomials or VFI.
Finally, table 2.5 presents the welfare cost of the business cycle. Now, in compar-
ison with the benchmark calibration, the welfare cost of the business cycle is positive
and signicant, slightly above 1.1 percent. This is not a surprise, since we have both a
large risk aversion and productivity shocks with an average standard deviation three
times as big as the observed one. All methods deliver numbers that are close.
2.5.3 Euler Equation Errors
While the plots of the decision rules and the computation of densities and business
cycle statistics that we presented in the previous subsection are highly informative,
it is also important to evaluate the accuracy of each of the procedures. Euler equa-
tion errors, introduced by Judd (1992), have become a common tool for determining
the quality of the solution method. The idea is to observe that, in our model, the
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intertemporal condition:
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given states kt; zt; t; and realizations zt+1 and t+1 should hold exactly for any given
kt, and zt. However, since the solution methods we use are only approximations, there
will be an error in (2.4) when we plug in the computed decision rules. This Euler
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This function determines the (unit free) error in the Euler equation as a fraction of
the consumption given the current states and solution method i. Following Judd and
Guu (1997), we can interpret this error as the optimization error incurred by the
use of the approximated decision rule and we report the absolute errors in base 10
logarithms to ease interpretation. Thus, a value of -3 means a $1 mistake for each
$1000 spent, a value of -4 a $1 mistake for each $10,000 spent, and so on.
Figure 2.5 displays a transversal cut of the errors for the benchmark calibration
when z = 0 and t = . Other transversal cuts at di¤erent technology and volatility
levels reveal similar patterns. The rst lesson from gure 5 is that all methods deliver
high accuracy. We know from gure 3 that capital is nearly always between 8.5 and
10.5. In that range, the (log10) Euler equation errors are at most -5, and most of the
time they are even smaller. For instance, the second- and third-order perturbations
have an Euler equation error of around -7 in the neighborhood of the deterministic
steady state, VFI of around -6.5, and Chebyshev an impressive -11/-13. The second
lesson from gure 5 is that, as expected, global methods (Chebyshev and VFI) perform
very well in the whole range of capital values, while perturbations deteriorate as we
move away from the steady state. For second-order perturbation, the Euler error in
the steady state is almost four orders of magnitude smaller than on the boundaries.
Third-order perturbation is around half an order of magnitude more accurate than
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second-order perturbation over the whole range of values (except in a small region
close to the deterministic steady state).
There are two complementary ways to summarize the information from Euler
equation error functions. First, in the second column of table 2.6 , we report the
maximum error in our interval (capital between 60 percent and 140 percent of the
steady state and the grids for productivity and volatility). The maximum Euler error
is useful because it bounds the mistake owing to the approximation. Both perturba-
tions have a maximum Euler error of around -2.7, VFI of -3.1, and Chebyshev, an
impressive -9.8. We read this column as indicating that all methods perform ade-
quately. The second procedure for summarizing Euler equation errors is to integrate
the function with respect to the ergodic distribution of capital and productivity to
nd the average error.6 We can think of this exercise as a generalization of the Den
HaanMarcet test (Den Haan and Marcet, 1994). We report our results in the third
column of table 2.6 . Both perturbations have roughly the same performance (around
-5.3), VFI a slightly better -6.4, while Chebyshev polynomials do fantastically well
at -10.4 (the average loss of welfare is $1 for each $500 billion). But even an approx-
imation with an average error of $1 for each $200,000, such as the one implied by
third-order perturbation, must su¢ ce for most relevant applications.
We repeat our exercise for the extreme calibration. Figure 2.6 displays the results
for the extreme case. As we did when we computed the decision rules of the agents,
we have changed the capital interval to [3,32]. Now, perturbations worsen more as
we get further away from the deterministic steady state. However, in the relevant
range of values of capital of [6,17], where, as reported in gure 4, nearly all the mass
of the ergodic distribution is, we still have Euler equation errors smaller than -3 and,
hence, probably small enough for most applications of interest. The performance
of VFI deteriorates around one order of magnitude with respect to our benchmark
calibration. Chebyshev polynomials su¤er more in relative terms (they started at a
quite outstanding accuracy level), but they still deliver the smallest errors in nearly
all the relevant range of capital.
Table 2.7 reports maximum Euler equation errors and their integrals. The max-
6There is the technical consideration of which ergodic distribution to use for this task, since this
is an object that can only be found by simulation. We use the ergodic simulation generated by VFI,
which slightly favors this method over the other ones. However, we checked that the results are
robust to using the ergodic distributions coming from the other methods.
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imum Euler equation error is large for perturbation methods while it is rather small
using Chebyshev polynomials. However, given the very large range of capital used in
the computation, this maximum Euler error provides a too negative view of accuracy.
We nd the integral of the Euler equation error to be much more instructive. With a
second-order perturbation, we have -4.02 and with a third-order perturbation we have
-4.12. To evaluate this number, remember that we have extremely high risk aversion
and large productivity shocks. Even in this challenging environment, perturbations
deliver a high degree of accuracy. VFI does not display a big loss of precision com-
pared to the benchmark case. On the other hand, Chebyshev polynomials deteriorate
somewhat, but the accuracy it delivers it is still of $1 out of each $1 million spent.
2.5.4 Robustness: Changing the EIS and Changing the Per-
turbation Point
In the results we reported above, we kept the EIS equal to 0.5, a conventional value
in the literature, while we modied the risk aversion and the volatility of produc-
tivity shocks. However, since some researchers prefer higher values of the EIS (see,
for instance, Bansal and Yaron, 2004, a paper that we have used to motivate our
investigation), we also computed our model with  = 1:5. Basically our results were
unchanged. To save on space, we concentrate only on the Euler equation errors (de-
cision rules and simulation paths are available upon request). In table ?? , we report
the maxima of the Euler equation errors and their integrals with respect to the er-
godic distribution. The relative size and values of the entries in this table are quite
similar to the entries in table 2.6 (except, partially, VFI that performs a bit better).
Table ?? repeats the same exercise for the extreme calibration. Again, the entries
in the table are very close to the ones in table 2.7 (and now, VFI does not perform
better than when  = 0:5).
As a nal robustness test, we computed the perturbations not around the deter-
ministic steady state (as we did in the main text), but around a point close to the
mode of the ergodic distribution of capital. This strategy, if perhaps di¢ cult to im-
plement because of the need to compute the mode of the ergodic distribution,7 could
7For example, the algorithm of nding a perturbation around the steady state, simulate from
it, nd a second perturbation around the model of the implied ergodic simulation, and so on until
convergence, may not settle in any xed point. In our exercise, we avoid this problem because we
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deliver better accuracy because we approximate the value function and decision rules
in a region where the model spends more time. As we suspected, we found only trivial
improvements in terms of accuracy. Moreover, expanding at a point di¤erent from
the deterministic steady state has the disadvantage that the theorems that ensure the
convergence of the Taylor approximation might fail (see theorem 6 in Jin and Judd,
2002).
2.5.5 Implementation and Computing Time
We briey discuss implementation and computing time. For the benchmark calibra-
tion, second-order perturbation and third- order perturbation algorithms take only
0.02 second and 0.05 second, respectively, in a 3.3GHz Intel PC with Windows 7 (the
reference computer for all times below), and it is simple to implement: 664 lines of
code in Fortran 95 for second order and 1133 lines of code for third order, plus in
both cases, the analytical derivatives of the equilibrium conditions that Fortran 95
borrows from a code written in Mathematica 6.8 The code that generates the an-
alytic derivatives has between 150 to 210 lines, although Mathematica is much less
verbose. While the number of lines doubles in the third order, the complexity in
terms of coding does not increase much: the extra lines are mainly from declaring
external functions and reading and assigning values to the perturbation coe¢ cients.
An interesting observation is that we only need to take the analytic derivatives once,
since they are expressed in terms of parameters and not in terms of parameter values.
This allows Fortran to evaluate the analytic derivatives extremely fast for new combi-
nations of parameter values. This advantage of perturbation is particularly relevant
when we need to solve the model repeatedly for many di¤erent parameter values, for
example, when we are estimating the model. For completeness, the second-order per-
turbation was also run in Dynare (although we had to use version 4.0, which computes
analytic derivatives, instead of previous versions, which use numerical derivatives that
are not accurate enough for perturbation). This run was a double-check of the code
have the ergodic distribution implied by VFI. This is an unfair advantage for perturbations at the
mode of the ergodic distribution but it makes our point below about the lack of improvement in
accuracy even stronger.
8We use lines of code as a proxy for the complexity of implementation. We do not count comment
lines.
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and a test of the feasibility of using o¤-the-shelf software to solve DSGE models with
recursive preferences.
The projection algorithm takes around 300 seconds, but it requires a good initial
guess for the solution of the system of equations. Finding the initial guess for some
combination of parameter values proved to be challenging. The code is 652 lines of
Fortran 95. Finally, the VFI code is 707 lines of Fortran 95, but it takes about ten
hours to run.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have compared di¤erent solution methods for DSGE models with
recursive preferences and SV. We evaluated the di¤erent algorithms based on accu-
racy, speed, and programming burden. We learned that all of the most promising
methods (perturbation, projection, and VFI) do a fair job in terms of accuracy. We
were surprised by how well simple second-order and third-order perturbations perform
even for fairly non-linear problems. We were impressed by how accurate Chebyshev
polynomials can be. However, their computational cost was higher and we are con-
cerned about the curse of dimensionality. In any case, it seems clear to us that, when
accuracy is the key consideration, Chebyshev polynomials are the way to go. Fi-
nally, we were disappointed by VFI since even with 125,000 points in the grid, it only
did marginally better than perturbation and it performed much worse than Cheby-
shev polynomials in our benchmark calibration. This suggests that unless there are
compelling reasons such as non-di¤erentiabilities or non-convexities in the model, we
better avoid VFI.
A theme we have not developed in this paper is the possibility of interplay among
di¤erent solution methods. For instance, we can compute extremely easily a second-
order approximation to the value function and use it as an initial guess for VFI.
This second-order approximation is such a good guess that VFI will converge in
few iterations. We veried this idea in non-reported experiments, where VFI took
one-tenth of the time to converge once we used the second-order approximation to
the value function as the initial guess. This approach may even work when the
true value function is not di¤erentiable at some points or has jumps, since the only
goal of perturbation is to provide a good starting point, not a theoretically sound
approximation. This algorithm may be particularly useful in problems with many
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state variables. More research on this type of hybrid method is a natural extension
of our work.
We close the paper by pointing out that recursive preferences are only one example
of a large class of non-standard preferences that have received much attention by
theorists and applied researchers over the last several years (see Backus, Routledge,
and Zin, 2004). Having fast and reliable solution methods for this class of new
preferences will help researchers to sort out which of these preferences deserve further
attention and to derive empirical implications. Thus, this paper is a rst step in the
task of learning how to compute DSGE models with non-standard preferences.
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2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Steady State of the Model
To solve the system:
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from which we can nd Vss and iss.
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2.7.2 Value Function Perturbation (VFP)
We mentioned in the main text that instead of perturbing the equilibrium conditions
of the model, we could directly perturb the value function in what we called value
function perturbation (VFP). To undertake the VFP, we write the value function as:
V (kt; zt; t;) = max
ct;lt

(1  )
 
ct (1  lt)
1  1  + EtV 1  (kt+1; zt+1; t+1;) 1 1 
To nd a second-order approximation to the value function, we take derivatives of
the value function with respect to controls (ct; lt), states (kt; zt; t), and the perturba-
tion parameter . We collect these 6 equations, together with the resource constraint,
the value function itself, and the exogenous processes in a system:
eF (kt; zt; ) = 0
where the hat over F emphasizes that now we are dealing with a slightly di¤erent set
of equations than the F in the main text.
After solving for the steady state of this system, we take derivatives of the functioneF with respect to kt, zt, t, and :
eFi (kss; 0; ss; 0) = 0 for i = f1; 2; 3; 4g
and we solve for the unknown coe¢ cients. This solution will give us a second-order ap-
proximation of the value function but only a rst-order approximation of the decision
rules. By repeating these steps n times, we can obtain the n + 1-order approxima-
tion of the value function and the n-order approximation of the decision rules. It is
straightforward to check that the coe¢ cients obtained by ECP and VFP are the same.
Thus, the choice for one approach or the other should be dictated by expediency.
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2.7.3 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter      log   
Value 0.991 0.357 0.3 0.0196 0.95 0.007 0.9 0.06
Table 2.2: Business Cycle Statistics - Benchmark Calibration
c y i Rf (%) Rk(%)
Mean
Second-Order Perturbation 0.7253 0.9128 0.1873 0.9070 0.9078
Third-Order Perturbation 0.7257 0.9133 0.1875 0.9062 0.9069
Chebyshev Polynomial 0.7256 0.9130 0.1875 0.9063 0.9066
Value Function Iteration 0.7256 0.9130 0.1875 0.9063 0.9066
Variance (%)
Second-Order Perturbation 0.0331 0.1084 0.0293 0.0001 0.0001
Third-Order Perturbation 0.0330 0.1079 0.0288 0.0001 0.0001
Chebyshev Polynomial 0.0347 0.1117 0.0313 0.0001 0.0001
Value Function Iteration 0.0347 0.1117 0.0313 0.0001 0.0001
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Table 2.3: Welfare Costs of Business Cycle - Benchmark Calibration
2nd-Order Pert. 3rd-Order Pert. Chebyshev Value Function
-2.0864e(-5) -2.0864e(-5) -3.2849e(-5) -3.2849e(-5)
Table 2.4: Business Cycle Statistics - Extreme Calibration
c y i Rf (%) Rk(%)
Mean
Second-Order Perturbation 0.7338 0.9297 0.1950 0.8432 0.8562
Third-Order Perturbation 0.7344 0.9311 0.1955 0.8416 0.8529
Chebyshev Polynomial 0.7359 0.9329 0.1970 0.8331 0.8402
Value Function Iteration 0.7359 0.9329 0.1970 0.8352 0.8403
Variance (%)
Second-Order Perturbation 0.2956 1.0575 0.2718 0.0004 0.0004
Third-Order Perturbation 0.3634 1.2178 0.3113 0.0004 0.0005
Chebyshev Polynomial 0.3413 1.1523 0.3425 0.0005 0.0006
Value Function Iteration 0.3414 1.1528 0.3427 0.0005 0.0006
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Table 2.5: Welfare Costs of Business Cycle - Extreme Calibration
2nd-Order Pert. 3rd-Order Pert. Chebyshev Value Function
1.1278e-2 1.1278e-2 1.2855e-2 1.2838e-2
Table 2.6: Euler errors - Benchmark Calibration
Max Euler Error Integral of the Euler Errors
Second-Order Perturbation -2.6294 -5.2350
Third-Order Perturbation -2.7437 -5.3164
Chebyshev Polynomial -9.7919 -10.4034
Value Function Iteration -3.0848 -6.4039
Table 2.7: Euler errors - Extreme Calibration
Max Euler Error Integral of the Euler Errors
Second-Order Perturbation -1.5188 -4.0195
Third-Order Perturbation -1.6698 -4.1189
Chebyshev Polynomial -4.8979 -5.9339
Value Function Iteration -2.5186 -6.2870
37
F
ig
ur
e
2.
1:
D
ec
is
io
n
R
ul
es
an
d
V
al
ue
Fu
nc
ti
on
,
be
nc
hm
ar
k
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
38
F
ig
ur
e
2.
2:
D
ec
is
io
n
R
ul
es
an
d
V
al
ue
Fu
nc
ti
on
,
ex
tr
em
e
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
39
F
ig
ur
e
2.
3:
D
en
si
ti
es
,
be
nc
hm
ar
k
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
40
F
ig
ur
e
2.
4:
D
en
si
ti
es
,
ex
tr
em
e
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
41
F
ig
ur
e
2.
5:
E
ul
er
E
qu
at
io
n
E
rr
or
,
be
nc
hm
ar
k
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
42
F
ig
ur
e
2.
6:
E
ul
er
E
qu
at
io
n
E
rr
or
s,
ex
tr
em
e
ca
lib
ra
ti
on
43
Chapter 3
International Business Cycles and
Financial Frictions
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3.1 Introduction
The question this paper addresses is the quantitative impact of nancial frictions on
the business cycle co-movements between countries when investors have foreign asset
exposure. The breakout and spread of the 2007 nancial crisis highlights the impor-
tance of nancial frictions for international business cycle co-movements: European
investors who were exposed to US mortgage-backed securities experienced a fall in
their net worth when the US market collapsed. The decline in net worth tightened
their leverage constraint and led to a contraction in investment activities in Europe.
To analyze this mechanism, this paper embeds this type of nancial friction within an
international real business cycle model and concludes that the presence of nancial
frictions helps the model do a better job of accounting for the correlations of output,
investment and employment in the data. In addtion, the model also shows that as
foreign asset exposure increases, business cycles become more synchronized.
I build a two-country model where credit contracts are imperfectly enforceable
and business cycles are driven by technology shocks. Each country has two types of
agents: investor and saver. The investor holds both domestic and foreign capital.
She receives risky returns by renting her capital to the market production rm. She
also borrows from the domestic saver to nance her capital holdings. Because the
investor cannot promise to repay her loans, she faces a leverage constraint that limits
her loans to be smaller than a portion of the market value of her total capital hold-
ings. The saver makes use of the domestic capital in home production and lends her
savings to the investor. Both agents work at the market production rm. Since I am
interested in evaluating business cycle implications quantitatively, I model explicitly
endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation. These ingredients are important
for two reasons. First, variation in hours contributes to most of the business cycle
uctuations. Second, nancial frictions can generate a large amplication e¤ect when
capital is xed. Introducing capital accumulation disciplines the exercise empirically.
The nancial frictions and foreign asset exposure in this model together generate
a multiplier e¤ect that amplies the transmission of shocks across countries. Output
correlation across countries is driven up through this nancial channel. When a
negative technology shock hits the domestic market, the demand for capital in the
home country falls, which forces down the price of domestic capital. The price decline
leads to a tightening of investorsleverage constraint in both countries. Borrowing is
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reduced globally and therefore demand for capital in the foreign country also declines.
Prices of foreign assets fall, triggering another round of decline in investment and
output. A multiplier e¤ect arises since the decline in investment lowers asset prices
and investorsnet worth, further pushing down investment. With the presence of the
nancial frictions and foreign asset exposure, the shock spills over from one country
to another and thus drives up the business cycle correlations.
To judge the empirical relevance of my framework, I conduct a quantitative exer-
cise aimed at exploring whether the existence of nancial frictions can improve the
models ability to account for cross-country correlations of output, employment and
investment. I calibrate the model to match the data from the US and the rest of the
industrial world. The model is then solved using an iterative second-order perturba-
tion method developed by Heathcote and Perri (2009). This is because when agents
have multiple assets, in the steady-state where risk is absent, the returns on the assets
are the same. Therefore the portfolio shares are not determinate and we need to use
information from higher-order perturbation to pin down steady-state portfolios.
The main ndings of the paper are the following. First, the simulation result shows
that the presence of nancial frictions together with foreign asset exposure improves
the business cycle co-movements along several dimensions: the calibrated model pro-
duces positive and sizable correlations of output, investment and employment. The
model produces an output correlation of 0.4, which accounts for two-thirds of the
output correlation in the data. The model also indicates an employment correlation
of 0.41, which is close to 0.43 in the data. Moreover, the model predicts a positive
investment correlation of 0.64, which is closer to the data than the model without
nancial frictions. Compared to the previous literature which tends to predict either
negative or positive but relatively small business cycle correlations, this model makes
good progress by taking nancial frictions into account.
Second, substantial di¤erences exist in impulse response functions between ver-
sions of the model with and without nancial frictions. Let me take the IRFs for
hours as an example; other IRFs will be discussed later in the main text. When the
leverage constraint is present, after a decline in productivity in country 1, hours fall in
both countries. Hours fall in country 1 because of lower wages. Hours fall in country
2 because of the leverage constraint. Since the fall in productivity leads to a decline
in the asset price in country 1, which tightens the leverage constraint of country 2s
investor, capital used in country 2s production is reduced. Hence hours in country 2
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also fall. However, in the case where nancial frictions are absent, when productivity
in country 1 falls, country 1s hours decline but country 2s hours increase because
country 2 is relatively more productive.
Third, this model also predicts that when the investor increases her foreign asset
exposure to the other country, the output correlation between the two countries in-
creases. This result is consistent with the evidence documented in Imbs (2006) that
output correlations rise with nancial integration.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. The rst strand ad-
dresses the co-movements of international business cycles. Backus, Kehoe, and Kyd-
land (1992) showed that in a complete market model, output, investment and labor
are negatively correlated because of e¢ cient allocation of resources across countries.
Baxter and Crucini (1995), Kollmann (1996), and Heathcote and Perri (2002) intro-
duced incomplete markets. However, they nd that incomplete markets do not help
much in matching the business cycle correlations in the data, because there is little
need for insurance markets.
The second strand is a recent and growing literature analyzing nancial frictions
in an open economy context, including Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), Faia
(2007) and Devereux and Yetman (2010). Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007)
builds a small open economy model with credit frictions to explore the connection
between the exchange rate regime and nancial distress in the case of the 1997 Korea
crisis. Faia (2007) studies nancial frictions in a two-country DSGE model showing
that business cycle synchronization increases when economies have similar nancial
structures, while it decreases with the degree of nancial openness. However, these
two papers and the previous literature did not study the impact of nancial frictions
when the constrained agents have foreign capital exposure.
The paper by Devereux and Yetman (2010) is the closest to my work in that
it studies nancial frictions and capital portfolio choice in a two-country model. In
contrast to my paper, their model lacks capital accumulation and endogenous labor
choice, which are the key ingredients for business cycle uctuations.
The third strand is the international portfolio choice literature, pioneered by Tille
and Van Wincoop(2007) and Devereux and Sutherland (2008) with a recent contri-
bution by Heathcote and Perri (2009). This literature uses higher order perturbation
to solve optimal portfolio allocations in DSGE models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the model economy,
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highlight the key mechanism and show how to solve this model. In Section 3, I discuss
the calibration of the model. In Section 4, I present the main results. I compare the
results from a model with nancial frictions and a model without nancial frictions. I
also provide some intuition for the results. In Section 5, I provide several robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Model
In this section I outline a two-country, one-good international business cycle model.
The world economy consists of two countries, home (country 1) and foreign (country
2), which are the same size. Each country has three sectors: a household sector,
a market production sector and a capital producer sector. The household sector is
populated with two types of innitely lived agents: investor and saver. The investor
and saver are distinct from each other in order to motivate lending and borrowing.
Adding the market production sector allows agents to derive returns from capital and
labor. Moreover, I have the capital producer to facilitate the introduction of variation
in capital price.
I assume that capital is mobile across the countries but labor is immobile across
the countries. The following subsections detail the economic choice faced by agents
in the two economies, the structure of production and the relevant market clearing
conditions.
3.2.1 Household
There are two types of households in the model: an investor and a saver. The investors
can buy the capital installed both domestically and abroad. They rent the capital to
the market production rm and receive a risky return. At the same time, they can
also borrow from domestic savers to nance their capital holdings. Investors account
for a fraction n of all households. The rest of the households participate only in the
domestic bond market and I refer to them as savers. Similar to the assumption made
in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), I assume that investors have the ability
to transform capital into a factor that can be used in the market good production.
However, since savers do not have this ability, they will purchase capital to be used
only in home production. Savers are assumed to be more patient than investors such
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that in equilibrium, savers always want to lend to investors. Finally, the credit friction
comes in the form of a leverage constraint: the debt that investors borrow cannot
exceed a certain fraction of their total asset value.
Investor
Investors in each country i choose consumption cIit, provide labor services l
I
it, and
make a portfolio choice among domestic capital, foreign capital and domestic debt.
Their utility is given by the following expression:
Et
1X
t=0

(CIit; L
I
it)
t 1
1  

cIit    I
(lIit)
1+
1 + 
1 
i = 1; 2 (3.1)
The Greenwood-Hercowitz-Hu¤man (GHH) preference is widely used in the open
economy literature. Early work includes Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). GHH
preference is chosen because there is no wealth e¤ect on labor supply. As a result,
only a substitution e¤ect operates on hours and suggests that the path of hours will
closely follow that of output.1 To ensure stationary equilibrium, I follow Mendoza
(1991) to assume an endogenous discount factor.
(CIit; L
I
it) =

1 + CIit    I
(LIit)
1+
1 + 
 !I
The discount factor is external in the sense that a household takes (CIit; L
I
it) as
exogenous. (CIit and L
I
it are the aggregate level of consumption and hours of investors.)
As shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), internalizing the discount factor makes
negligible quantitative di¤erences.
The period budget constraint of a representative investor is given by
cIit + q
k
itk
I
ii;t+1 + q
k
jtk
I
ij;t+1 = witl
I
it + q
b
itB
I
it+1  BIit
+ ((1  )qkit +Rkit)kIii;t + ((1  )qkjt +Rkjt   t)kIij;t (3.2)
Here qkit denotes the price of capital in country i, q
b
it denotes the price of a bond in
1GHH preferences are commonly used in the open economy literature, dating back to Mendoza
(1991) and Devereux, Gregory and Smith (1992). Recent examples include Mendoza and Smith
(2002) and Ra¤o (2009).
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country i (qbit =
1
1+Rbit
where Rbit is the risk-free rate), k
I
ijt+1 denotes the capital in
country j held by an investor from country i. In each period, the investor receives a
return Rkit (R
k
jt) by renting the capital to the market production rm in country i (j).
She also receives labor income by supplying labor to the market production rm. She
then sells the capital after depreciation back to the capital producer at price qkit (q
k
jt).
By assumption, the investor is less patient than the saver; therefore, in equilibirum
she will always borrow from the saver at the risk-free rate to nance the purchase of
capital for the next period.
In order to introduce home bias in the investors capital holdings, following Tille
and Wincoop (2007), I assume that there is some extra uncertainty about the capital
return from the foreign market. This represents the fact that it is more di¢ cult for
a domestic investor to invest in the foreign market, and therefore, she faces a riskier
return. Specically, the return from the foreign country that the investor receives is
subject to2
t  N(0; 2)
I assume that the investor may default on her debt; thus she always has to put
down collateral against her debt. That is, the investor faces a collateral constraint
(or leverage constraint) that restricts her debt to be smaller than a fraction  of the
value of the asset o¤ered as collateral.
BIit+1  (qkitkIii;t+1 + qkjtkIij;t+1) where 0    1 (3.3)
Here BIit+1 denotes the amount of debt that she can borrow from the domestic saver
and  controls the leverage ratio. This form of leverage constraint is in the style of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Mendoza and Smith (2002). Since the debt level is
linked directly to the investors total asset value, any uctuation in either countrys
capital price will have an immediate impact on the borrowing capacity of the investors
in both countries. Therefore, both the leverage constraint and the foreign capital
exposure are the key ingredients that help to amplify the transmission of technology
shocks across countries.
2It is quite standard to introduce exogenous nancial frictions, such as Tille and Van Wincoop
(2007) and Devereux and Sutherland (2009).
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The FOCs for the investor are
qkitU
I
ci;t
= ItEtU
I
ci;t+1
((1  )qkit+1 +Rkit+1) + itqkit (3.4)
qkjtU
I
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ItEtU
I
ci;t+1
((1  )qkjt+1 +Rkjt+1   t+1) + itqkjt (3.5)
qbitU
I
ci;t
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ItEtU
I
ci;t+1
+ it (3.6)
wit =  
I(lIit)
 (3.7)
where it is the Lagrange multiplier on country is leverage constraint. We can see
that when it is positive, the investor wants to borrow more from the saver but is
constrained by the leverage constraint.
Saver
Consider a saver with GHH preferences described by
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and
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cSMit
e
+ (1  )
 
cSHit
e1=e
lSit = l
SM
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The period utility is dened over four arguments: cSMit is the consumption of a market
good in country i, cSHit is the consumption of a home good, l
SM
it is labor time spent
in market production and lSHit is labor time spent in home production. The elasticity
of substitution between cSMit and c
SH
it is given by
1
1 e . The discount factor is dened
similarly to that of an investor:
(CSit ; L
S
it) =

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1+
1 + 
 !S
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where !S represents the elasticity of the discount factor to the composite 1 + CSit  
 I
(LSit)
1+
1+
.
At each date, the saver is subject to a market budget constraint that allocates
total income between two uses: the purchase of the market consumption good and
the purchase of household capital. Capital is sold back to the capital producer after
being used in the home production. I assume that capital depreciates at rate . For
simplicity, I assume it to be the same as the depreciation rate in the market production
sector. The saver receives an interest payment on the bond she purchased. She also
gets labor income by supplying labor to the market production rm. If wit is the
wage rate, and qbit is the price for bond, then the budget constraint can be written as
cSMit + q
k
itk
S
ii;t+1 = witl
SM
it + (1  )qkitkSii;t + qbitBSit+1  BSit (3.10)
The saver is also subject to the home production constraint at each date
cSHit = G(k
S
ii;t; l
SH
it ) (3.11)
I assume that home production has a Cobb-Douglas production technology of the
form
G(kSii;t; l
SH
it ) = (k
S
ii;t)
2(lSHit )
1 2 (3.12)
Solving the savers problem leads to the following FOCs:
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1 e
(1  ) (cSHit )
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3.2.2 Capital Producer
In each country, there is one representative capital producer who operates in a per-
fectly competitive market. At the end of period t, the capital producer purchases
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nal goods iit and the undepreciated physical capital (1   )ki;t that has been used
in period ts production cycle. The capital producer uses these inputs to produce
new installed capital kit+1 using the following constant return to scale production
technology
ki;t+1 = (1  )ki;t + 

ii;t
ki;t

ki;t
I assume that the construction of new capital goods is subject to adjustment costs,
whereas the repair of old capital goods is not. The following specication for adjust-
ment cost is adopted


ii;t
ki;t

=
g1
1  

ii;t
ki;t
1 
+ g2
where () is a positive, concave function. I denote the price of the new capital to be
qki;t, then the parameter  controls the elasticity of q
k
i;t with respect to the investment
to capital ratio. This specication allows the shadow price of installed capital to
diverge from the price of an additional unit of capital, i.e., it permits variation in
the price qki;t: Similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the idea is to have asset price
variability contribute to volatility in the investors balance sheet.
Since the marginal rate of transformation from previously installed capital to new
capital is unity, the price of old capital is also qki;t. The rms prots at time t is
i;t = q
k
i;tki;t+1   qki;t(1  )ki;t   ii;t
The capital producer therefore solves
max
kt;it
i;t = q
k
i;tki;t+1   qki;t(1  )ki;t   ii;t
s:t: ki;t+1 = (1  )ki;t + 

ii;t
ki;t

ki;t
Solving the maximization problem above leads to the following expression for capital
price
qki;t =
1
0

ii;t
ki;t
 (3.17)
Moreover, the new installed capital produced in each country (kit) is bought by three
types of agent: the domestic investor (kIiit), the foreign investor (k
I
jit) and the domestic
53
saver (kSiit).
k1t = nk
I
11t + nk
I
21t + (1  n)kS11t
k2t = nk
I
12t + nk
I
22t + (1  n)kS22t
3.2.3 Production
The structure of the market production rm is straightforward. The rm lives for
only one period and has a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital and labor.
The production of the market good is subject to a stochastic technology shock zmit .
F (zmit ; k
I
i;t; lit) = e
zmit (kIi;t)
1(lit)
1 1 (3.18)
The rm rents capital from domestic and foreign investors
kIi;t = n(k
I
ii;t + k
I
ji;t) (3.19)
and it also rents labor from the domestic investor and the domestic saver
lit = nl
I
it + (1  n)lSMit (3.20)
The optimality conditions for the rm are
wit = FL(z
m
it ; k
I
i;t; lit) (3.21)
Rkit = FK(z
m
it ; k
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I assume that the law of motion for the technology shock to market production is
given by a stationary VAR of the form"
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where m1 represents the persistence of the technology shock and 
m
2 represents the
spillover e¤ect of the technology shock. The innovation follows"
m1t
m2t
#
 N(0;) with correlation matrix
"
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(3.24)
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where m is the correlation between the two technology shocks.
3.2.4 Market Clearing
There are two sets of market clearing conditions: the bond market clearing and the
good market clearing. Since the bond market is assumed to be domestic, the total
bond within a country is zero, which gives the following conditions,
nBI1t+1 + (1  n)BS1t+1 = 0 (3.25)
nBI2t+1 + (1  n)BS2t+1 = 0 (3.26)
Now I develop the aggregate resource constraint for this economy.
ncI1t + (1  n)cSM1t + ncI2t + (1  n)cSM2t +  t + i1t + i2t = F (zm1t ; kI1t; l1t) +F (zm2t ; kI2t; l2t)
(3.27)
The market good clearing gives that total market output is used in three aspects:
total market consumption, total investment and the sum of the portfolio cost  t:
3.2.5 Model Mechanism
This section reviews the main mechanism of the model and highlights important para-
meters. I show that both nancial frictions and foreign asset exposure are important
in leading to the increase in business cycle co-movements. When a negative technol-
ogy shock hits the domestic market, the demand for capital in the home country falls,
which forces down investment and the price of domestic capital. The degree to which
the price of capital falls depends on the parameter , which controls the elasticity of
price with respect to the investment to capital ratio. As  becomes larger, the capital
price is more variable in response to a change in investment.
qki;t =
1
0

ii;t
ki;t
 = 1
g1

ii;t
ki;t

From the investors leverage constraint below, we see that the fall in the asset price
leads to a tightening of investorsleverage constraint in both countries. Borrowing
is thus reduced globally. Since the leverage ratio is 1
1  for a given , as  becomes
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bigger, the leverage ratio is higher. Hence the decline in global borrowing is steeper.
BIit+1  (qkitkIii;t+1 + qkjtkIij;t+1) where 0    1
As borrowing falls globally, demand for capital in the foreign country also declines,
which pushes down the price of the foreign asset, leading to another round of credit
tightening. A multiplier e¤ect arises, since the decline in investment lowers asset
prices and investorsnet worth, further pushing down investment.
From the equation above, we can see that by considering foreign exposure, the
foreign asset price has an immediate e¤ect on the balance sheet of domestic investors.
Along with the presence of the nancial frictions, the technology shock spills over
from one country to another and thus drives up the business cycle correlations.
3.2.6 Solution Method
This model is solved using an iterative second-order perturbation method adopted
from Heathcote and Perri (2009). The standard method to analyze DSGE model is
to take a linear approximation around a deterministic steady-state. However, this
method cannot be used to solve the current model. Because when we have more
than one asset, in the steady-state the returns are the same across assets. Hence the
portfolio shares are indeterminate: any share of domestic and foreign capital holdings
will be consistent with the steady-state. The way to nd a steady-state portfolio share
is to use information from the higher order approximation. The detailed algorithm is
documented in the Appendix.
3.3 Calibration
I now proceed to choose parameter values, setting some numbers on the basis of a
priori information and setting others according to the steady-state conditions. A
period in the model corresponds to one quarter. The sample period in the data is
from 1972:1 to 2008:4. Table 3.1 gives a summary of the calibration.
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3.3.1 Preference and Production Parameters
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is set to 0.5, which is standard in
the literature. The parameter !S, which controls the savers discount factor, is set
to 0.039 to match an annual interest rate of 4%. Following Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999), I use the investors discount factor to match an interest premium
on borrowed funds of 2%, approximately the historical average spread between the
prime lending rate and the six-month Treasury bill rate. This gives !I the value of
0.112. The implied steady-state discount factor for the saver is 0.99 and the implied
steady-state discount factor for the investor is 0.97. For the elasticity of labor supply,
in line with Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988), I calibrate it to be 1.7, which
corresponds to  = 0:6:
The depreciation rate  is set to 0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation
rate of 10%. I now use 1(capital share of market production); 2(capital share of
home production);  I(investors labor supply level);  S(savers labor supply level) and
(share of market consumption good) to match the following ve observations: the
market capital-to-output ratio, the home capital-to-output ratio, the market hours
for the investor, the market hours for the saver and the home hours for the saver. Ac-
cording to Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright (1995), the home capital to output ratio
is 5, where home capital is dened as consumer durables plus residential structures.
Since the total capital to output ratio is around 12, as given by Cooley and Precsott
(1995), the market capital to output ratio is set to 7. I choose the hours worked for
market production to be 0.33 and the hours spend on home production to be 0.25.
This calibration gives a capital share of market production (1) of 0.29 and a capital
share of home production (2) of 0.40.
The only preference parameter that is left unspecied is e, the elasticity of substi-
tution between the market and home consumption good. A higher value of e means
that the saver is more willing to substitute consumption of one sectors output with
consumption of the other sectors output. The empirical evidence on e is controver-
sial. Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) suggest that the two goods are very close to
perfect substitutes. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) use PSID data to esti-
mate this elasticity, which results in a value of 0.8 for e. McGrattan, Rogerson and
Wright (1993) use a maximum likelihood approach to estimate a model with home
production and they come up with a value of 0.429. For the benchmark model, I use
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an intermediate value among existing estimates, e = 0:9. In what follows I will also
consider several alternative values of e as a robustness test.
The elasticity of the capital price with respect to the investment to capital ratio,
, is taken to be 0.25, following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). This is one
of the key parameters in the model since capital price is crucial for determining the
level of loans for investor and hence the global investment level. However, there is
no rm consensus in the literature about what this parameter value should be. A
reasonable assumption about the adjustment cost suggest that the value should lie
within a range of 0. to 0.5.3 The parameter  controls the variance of the extra
risk from investing in the foreign country. When this risk is absent, only 14% of the
investors capital holdings are domestic, exhibiting a substantial bias against home
capital. This observation is consistent with theory since when an agents labor income
is correlated with her home capital return, to diversify this risk the agent will take
a larger position in the foreign country. I set  to be 0.14 such that 75% of the
investors asset are domestic.
When the leverage constraint is binding, the leverage ratio is 1
1  for a given . In
this model, I calibrate the leverage ratio to be 3, according to Dedola and Lombardo
(2010). This number is higher than the leverage ratio used in Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999), since I consider not only non-nancial rms but also nancial rms.
In this model, savers do not have access to the equity market; therefore, I calibrate
the share of savers to match the fraction of the population who do not participate in
the stock market. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances (2007), about half
of US households have become stock owners. Therefore, I set the share of savers to
be 0.5.
3.3.2 Technology Parameters
For the benchmark calibration, I follow the estimates from Heathcote and Perri
(2004). They estimate the parameters of the bivariate shock process using estimates
of Solow residuals. They subtract a common deterministic growth trend from Solow
residuals and then estimate by least squares. In this case, the productivity shocks
3Jermann (1998) uses a value of 0.23. Christensen and Dib (2008) give an estimate of 0.59 by
Bayesian estimation. Meier and Muller (2006) report an estimate of 0.65, close to Christensen and
Dib (2008).
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still display high persistence and positively correlated innovations, but they no longer
nd evidence of spillovers. This gives the following estimates"
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In the sensitivity analysis, I also use the productivity estimates from Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992), where there is some evidence of spillover. The estimates
are "
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and I maintain the same covariance matrix as in Heathcote and Perri (2004).
3.4 Results
In this section, I analyze the quantitative implications of my model. First, I report
the moments generated by the model and compare them with the data. Second, I
look at the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the technology shock to analyze the
model mechanism.
3.4.1 Moments
The results of the simulation under the benchmark calibration are summarized in
Table 3.2. The rst column of Table 3.2 shows the statistics calculated from the
data. Panels (A), (B) and (C) are calculated from US time series for the period of
1972:1 to 2008:4. The statistics from panel (D) represent the correlation of US series
with series from the rest of the industrial world (which is an aggregate of Europe,
Japan and Canada). The details of the aggregation of the rest of the world data are
shown in the Appendix. Except for net exports, all series are logged and ltered by
the Hodrick-Prescott lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. In the table, output
and consumption refer to market output and consumption while investment refers to
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total investment.4
The third column of Table 3.2, "Model 2: Constrained with 25% Foreign Ex-
posure," is our benchmark model with calibrations documented in Section 3. The
second column of Table 3.2, "Model 1: Unconstrained," is the same as Model 2 ex-
cept that the investor does not face a leverage constraint. The last column, "Model
3: Constrained with 86% Foreign Exposure," is the model where instead of imposing
a 75% home bias, I let the investor fully diversify her portfolio such that, as shown
in the calibration, she holds 86% of the capital in the foreign market.
We rst compare the data with the results from the constrained economy (Model
2). As we see from the cross-country correlations in panel (D) of Table 3.2, the
constrained economy produces two-thirds of the output correlation in the data. It
also produces a positive correlation of investment and employment, among which
the employment correlation is well matched to the data. When we compare the
constrained economy (Model 2) with the unconstrained economy (Model 1), we can
see an overall improvement in the cross-country correlations. The unconstrained
economy predicts a consumption correlation and an output correlation that are too
low, relative to the data. The constrained economy does better, predicting a higher
level of output correlation. Although it overshoots the consumption correlation, it
is still closer to the data than the unconstrained economy. In terms of investment
and employment, both models predict positive correlations, while the constrained
economy is closer to the moments in the data.
Overall, the model with constraint performs better in terms of the cross-country
correlations. The presence of the leverage constraint increases the correlation of
consumption, labor and output, while it decreases the correlation of investment. As
will be shown in the IRF analysis in Section 4.2, those improvements are introduced
exactly by the nancial frictions.
In terms of the within-country moments, in general the model with constraint
gives moments that are closer to the moments in the data. The constrained economy
replicates the level of output volatility in the data; however, output in the uncon-
strained economy (2.54%) is more volatile than in the constrained economy (1.92%).
The high volatility of the unconstrained economy is introduced by the frequent sub-
stitution between market and home consumption. In terms of relative volatility, both
4The denition of investment is consistent with that in the data.
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models overpredict the volatility of consumption while underpredict the volatility of
investment in the data. For the within country correlations, both models give positive
correlations of net export with output while we see negative correlations in the data.
We then compare the di¤erence induced by nancial exposure. The investor in
Model 2 holds 25% of capital in the foreign market, while the investor in Model 3
holds 86% of capital in the foreign market. The impact of this foreign asset exposure
on the business cycle co-movements is immediate. If we look at the cross-country
correlations, output correlation increases from 0.4 to 0.53. Consumption and labor
also rise because of the increased synchronization of output. Investment correlation,
on the other hand, falls. As foreign capital exposure increases, foreign asset prices
will have a more profound impact on the debt level of the investor, which in turn
inuences domestic investment and output. Hence, the output correlation is driven
up by increased foreign asset exposure.
3.4.2 Impulse Responses
In this section, I explain why the behavior of the three models di¤ers. I analyze the
response of the two-country economy to a one standard-deviation negative shock in
country 1. As in all the subsequent gures, the time units on the graphs are to be
interpreted as quarters.
Figures 3.1-3.4 show the impact of a one-standard-deviation decline in country 1s
technology shock. The upper panel shows country 1s response and the lower panel
shows country 2s response. In each plot, the solid line corresponds to the impulse
response in the constrained economy (Model 2) and the dashed line corresponds to
the impulse response in the unconstrained economy (Model 1). In the gure, output
and consumption refer to market output and consumption while investment refers to
total investment.
Leverage Constraint
We rst analyze the response of the constrained economy (Model 2). When a negative
shock hits, the demand for capital in country 1 immediately falls, leading to a 0.9%
decline in investment in country 1. Following the weak demand for capital, the price
of capital in country 1 falls 0.22%. Since investors hold leveraged portfolio across
countries, the decline in asset prices in country 1 leads to a reduction in total wealth
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for investors in both countries. Therefore, the leverage constraints are tightened
globally and the debts that investors are eligible to lend are reduced. We observe a
0.6% decline of debt in country 1 and a 0.2% decline of debt in country 2. After the
global decline of debt, not only do investors in country 1 have a weak demand for
capital, but so do investors in country 2. Hence, investment and capital price fall in
country 2 as well. The decline in capital price thus triggers another round of declines
in investment and output.
Since the decline in the demand for capital reduces the income of the investor, the
investors consumption falls. As the savers su¤er from a decline in their wage income,
saversconsumption is also reduced. Overall, total market consumption in country 1
falls around 1.4% and that of country 2 falls around 0.2%.
Upon the negative shock to productivity, wages fall in country 1; hence, the in-
vestor and savers labor supplies are reduced immediately in country 1. We observe a
0.8% decline in total market labor for country 1. For the market labor in country 2,
since there is no wealth e¤ect on investors labor for GHH preferences, the investors
market labor supply in country 2 does not move. However, since the saver faces sub-
stitution between home and market consumption, the wealth e¤ect and substitution
e¤ect both a¤ect her labor supply.5 When the shock hits, the wealth e¤ect dominates
the substitution e¤ect and the saver in country 2 increases her market labor supply.
However, this e¤ect is minimum as it only leads to a one basis-point movement. Next
period, the substitution e¤ect becomes larger and the savers market labor supply
falls.
The output of market production in country 1 falls by 1.4% in the next period,
and through the transmission mechanism introduced by the leverage constraint, the
output of market production in country 2 falls by around 0.1%.
In country 2, we also see an increase in the capital used in home production.
Because the domestic saver holds a portfolio of domestic capital and a bond, a decline
in the demand for the bond makes the saver shift her assets to domestic capital;
therefore, the capital used in home production increases.
5From Equations (15) and (16) we see that consumption shows up in the FOC for savers labor
choice, therefore a¤ecting the savers labor decision.
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No Leverage Constraint
We then analyze the response of the unconstrained economy (Model 1). When the
investor is not facing a leverage constraint, an unexpected one-standard-deviation
decline in country 1s productivity leads to a fall in the return on market capital in
country 1. We observe a fall in the debt level in country 1, because home production
becomes more productive than market production, making the saver shift her holdings
from a bond to home capital. From Figure 3.1 we also observe an increase in the debt
level in country 2. This is because the investor from country 2 su¤ers from her
investment loss in country 1 caused by the low return on market capital and she
does not face any form of collateral constraint; therefore she increases her debt to
compensate for her investment loss. The changes in the debt level in country 2 also
lead to a decline in the purchase of home capital in country 2, because the increase
in the debt level indicates an increase in the bond holdings of the saver. As the saver
holds more bonds, she rebalances her portfolio by reducing her exposure to home
capital.
Because of the decline in productivity in country 1s market sector, country 2
now looks more productive. Market capital ows from country 1 to country 2; thus,
Figure 3.3 shows an increase in market capital in country 2. Market output in country
2 follows a pattern similar to that of market capital: market output in country 2
increases after the shock. Investment and capital prices in both countries fall. In
country 1, the decline in investment is mainly driven by market capital: investment in
market capital falls because of a lower return. In country 2, the decline in investment
is mainly driven by home capital: the investment in home capital falls because of the
savers portfolio balancing.
Comparison
After examining the two scenarios separately, we now put them together for compar-
ison. There are several points to note. First, upon a negative technology shock to
country 1, market output in country 2 declines in the constrained economy, whereas it
increases in the unconstrained economy. The response of the unconstrained economy
is similar to the situation in a standard model with complete markets: capital ows
into the more productive country, leading to negative responses of the production
factors. The e¤ect of the nancial frictions becomes apparent when we look at the
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response of the constrained economy. The presence of the leverage constraint limits
investorsability to invest in both countries. Since they are constrained from getting
more loans, they do not have many resources to invest; therefore, although country
2s investment opportunity is better, market capital in country 2 still declines.
Second, the decline of consumption in country 2 in the constrained economy is
nearly three times as much as in the unconstrained economy. For the unconstrained
economy, country 2s consumption declines only 0.06%. Since the investor is not con-
strained, she can borrow from the saver to cushion her investment loss; therefore, her
consumption is barely a¤ected. However, for the constrained economy, the investor
cannot borrow as much as she wants; hence, consumption is a¤ected to a greater
degree, leading to a 0.18% decline.
Third, investment in country 2 falls less in the constrained economy than in the
unconstrained economy. The reason is the following: investment is dened as total
investment in the country which means that it is the sum of investment in market
production and investment in home production. In the constrained economy, invest-
ment in the market sector falls because of the tightened leverage constraint for the
investor. However, investment in the home sector rises because the saver shifts her
portfolio from bonds to home capital. These two forces work against each other and
the fall in market investment outweighs the increase in home investment, leading to
an overall decline of investment. In the unconstrained economy, market investment
in country 2 rises because relative productivity in country 1 is now higher. At the
same time, investment in the home sector declines because now the saver shifts her
portfolio from home capital to bonds. These two forces result in a decline in the total
investment level in country 2 and the magnitude is larger than in the constrained
economy.
Fourth, the debt levels in the two countries move in the same direction in the
constrained economy, whereas the debt levels move in di¤erent directions in the un-
constrained economy. For the constrained economy, debt falls in both countries be-
cause the leverage constraints in both countries are tightened. For the unconstrained
economy, country 2s investor increases her debt to o¤set the loss in investment in
country 1.
To briey sum up, the di¤erences discussed above are exactly introduced by the
nancial frictions. The nancial frictions drive up output, consumption and employ-
ment correlations and drive down the investment correlation.
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Degree of Foreign Exposure
In this section, I look at di¤erent degrees of foreign asset exposure. I compare two
cases: Model 2, in which investors are holding 25% of their capital in the foreign
market and Model 3, in which investors are holding 86% of their capital in the foreign
market. Figures 3.5-3.8 show the impact of a one-standard-deviation decline in coun-
try 1s technology level. The upper panel shows country 1s response to the shock and
the lower panel shows country 2s response. In each plot, the solid line corresponds
to the impulse response for the 25% foreign exposure economy and the dashed line
corresponds to the 86% foreign exposure economy.
Given the same level of decline in capital prices in country 1 for both economies
(Figure 3.5), it is straightforward to see that the more foreign capital the investor
holds, the more she su¤ers from tightening of the leverage constraint. This idea is
conrmed in Figure 3.5, which shows the response of the debt level in country 2.
We notice that when the investor holds 86% of foreign capital, her debt level falls
three times more than in the case where she only holds 25% of foreign capital. The
debt level further inuences other economic activities, and output and consumption
decrease. Therefore, a larger balance-sheet exposure to risky foreign capital results
in the business cycles that are more synchronized between the two countries.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we report the results of the sensitivity analysis with respect to some
key parameters in the model. Specically, I explore some alternative values for the
investment adjustment cost, leverage ratio, shock process and elasticity of substitution
between home and market goods.
3.5.1 Adjustment Cost
The parameter  controls the elasticity of the capital price with respect to the invest-
ment to capital ratio. As discussed in the calibration, the estimate of this elasticity
varies a lot. A recent paper by Christensen and Dib (2008) estimates  to be 0.59
using data on investment. Other papers such as Meier and Muller (2006) give an
even higher value of 0.65. Therefore, as a robustness check, we set  to 0.5, implying
a larger investment adjustment cost and a slower response of investment. We also
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set  to 100; in this case the adjustment cost is so large that investment does not
move at all. The model is then reduced to a version where capital is xed in each
country, which is similar to the setup of Devereux and Yetman (2010).6 I argue that
a signicant di¤erence exists between the model with and without capital accumula-
tion. When capital cannot move across countries, the business cycle synchronization
becomes stronger.
Table 3.3 shows the simulation results when  is 0.25, 0.5 and 100, respectively.
As  increases and as we move from left to right of the table, we see an increase in
the cross-country correlations in all macro variables. The important role that  plays
in the propagation mechanism is obvious. When the investment adjustment cost
becomes higher, the capital price responds more to a technology shock. Since the
capital price has an immediate impact on the investors balance sheet, it inuences
the level of loans and the investors future investment decisions. Therefore, when the
investment adjustment cost increases, business cycles are more synchronized. A higher
adjustment cost, on the other hand, also implies that investment is less responsive to
shocks. Therefore, we see a decline in the investment volatility.
3.5.2 Leverage Ratio
Now I experiment with a higher leverage ratio for the investors leverage constraint.
As shown in the previous section, the leverage constraint serves as an important
channel for the propagation of technology shocks. From the leverage constraint below,
we see that as  becomes bigger, the bigger the impact the investors asset value has
on the eligible loans.
BIit+1  (qkitkIii;t+1 + qkjtkIij;t+1)
Since many nancial rms have higher leverage ratios, we set  to 0.8, corresponding
to a leverage ratio of 5. As seen from Table 3.4, output volatility increases compared
to economy with lower leverage. There is also an increase in the cross-country cor-
relations of consumption, output and labor. Consumption correlation increases 0.06,
while output correlation and labor correlation increase 0.07.
6However, the two models are still not the same since this one has endogenous labor. Capital in
this case can be interpreted as land, which is not mobile across countries but nevertheless can be
owned by di¤erent investors.
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3.5.3 Di¤erent Shock Process
In the benchmark calibration, there is no spillover between the two technology shocks.
Therefore I conduct a sensitivity analysis regarding the spillovers. The calibration for
the technology shock is taken from Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), where the
persistence of the shock is 0.906 and the spillover is 0.088. The covariance matrix for
the innovation remains the same.
From the last column of Table 3.4, we observe an increase in the consumption
correlation and a decline in output, investment and investment correlations. When
there is spillover between technology shocks, the consumption correlation increases
from 0.53 to 0.63. This is because a negative shock to one country signals that the
other countrys output will also decline in the future. Consumers in that country take
this into account and lower their current consumption. Therefore, the consumption
correlation goes up when a technology shock spills over from one country to the other.
Kehoe and Perri (2002) nd a similar e¤ect in their paper.
3.5.4 Elasticity of Substitution between Goods
Since the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and market goods
span a wide range, we experiment with di¤erent values of e: 0.9, 0.5 and 0.1. As e
gets smaller, it is more di¢ cult to substitute between the two goods. Table 3.5 shows
the simulation results for di¤erent values of e. As e gets smaller, the correlations
of output, labor and consumption become smaller, while the investment correlation
becomes larger.
The decline in the correlations of consumption, output and labor becomes appar-
ent when we look at the savers FOC for labor choice. Because the saver substitutes
between home and market goods, consumption starts to have an impact on the labor
choice. In other words, the wealth e¤ect starts to show up in the savers labor choice.
Therefore, as e gets smaller, the saver starts to supply more labor because she feels
poorer. This then reduces the correlation of labor. Thus the correlation of output
is also reduced. The increase in the investment correlation occurs because when e is
close to zero, it gets very di¢ cult to substitute between market and home consump-
tion; therefore, the role of home production is reduced to a minimum. Thus we see
an increase in the investment correlation.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper argues that nancial frictions are important for international business
cycles because they magnify the propagation of technology shocks across countries
through the balance sheet of leveraged investors.
I have shown that incorporating nancial frictions and exposure to foreign assets,
which seems to be an important aspect of the recent nancial crisis, helps us do a bet-
ter job of accounting for business cycle correlations across countries. The calibrated
model can explain two-thirds of the output correlations in the data. The employment
correlation matches the correlation in the data well and the correlation of investment
gets closer to the data compared to the model without nancial frictions. Moreover,
the model also shows that, consistent with the data, when investors have more foreign
asset exposure to the other country, the output correlation between the two countries
increases.
My study rea¢ rms the growing attention in the open economy literature to inte-
grating nancial market frictions in otherwise standard two-country models. I docu-
ment the importance of including nancial frictions and foreign asset exposure in the
analysis. Since this model is able to replicate some key facts of international business
cycles, I believe that this framework is a promising one for conducting further re-
search, particularly on welfare analysis and the design of monetary and scal policies.
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3.7 Appendices
3.7.1 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is dened as a sequence of allocations {cIit; c
SM
it ; c
SH
it ; k
I
ii;t+1;
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S
ii;t+1; l
I
it; l
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it ; l
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k
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b
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k
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such that both the representative household and the rm maximize and the market
clears. The set of equilibrium conditions that characterize the time paths for the
allocation and prices are given by the rst order conditions for the households and
the rm that follow, together with the market clearing conditions and the stochastic
process for the technology. To save space, only equilibrium conditions for country 1
are shown below
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Rk1t = FK(k
I
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1(it; kt)kt
(3.43)
where it is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the leverage constraint in country
i and the total capital used in country 1 is
k1t = nk
I
11t + nk
I
21t + (1  n)kS11t
The capital used by market production in country 1 is
kI1t = nk
I
11t + nk
I
21t
The law of motion for total capital in country 1 is
k1t+1 = (1  )k1t + (
i1t
k1t
)k1t
The world market clearing condition is
ncI1t + (1  n)cSM1t + ncI2t + (1  n)cSM2t +  t + i1t + i2t = F (kI1t; l1t) + F (kI2t; l2t)
By Walras Law, the world market clearing condition is redundant.
70
3.7.2 Computation
This appendix describes an algorithm for computing the equilibrium portfolios in
open economy DSGE models. To a large extent, existing open economy models
ignore portfolio composition, analyzing nancial linkage between countries in terms
of net foreign assets, with no distinction made between assets and liabilities. There is
a growing literature that tries to develop methods to solve portfolio problems in these
models. This work has been pioneered by Devereux and Sutherland (2009) and Tille
and Wincoop (2007) with a recent contribution by Heathcote and Perri (2009). The
idea of these three methods is essentially the same: If we have more than one asset,
then the asset returns in the steady-state are the same. Therefore, the portfolios
are indeterminate in the steady-state. In order to use the perturbation method to
solve the model, we need steady-state portfolio shares to perturb around. In general,
we use information from second-order perturbations to determine the steady-state
portfolios.
To be specic, in my model the steady-state returns to capital in market produc-
tion are the same across countries. Therefore, although the total amount of capital
used in market production is known, the distribution is indeterminate: home and
foreign investors can hold an arbitrary portion of the total market capital. I use the
algorithm developed by Heathcote and Perri (2009) in solving this model.
Step 1 : Calculate the non-stochastic symmetric steady-state equilibrium. We
denote the steady-state as [11; 22; X; Y ] where 11 is the market capital in country
1 held by country 1 investors, 22 is the market capital in country 2 held by country 2
investors. X is the steady-state of non-portfolio state variables and Y is the steady-
state of non-portfolio control variables. The rst order conditions pin down the value
of X and Y , while any value of 0 = 11 = 22 is consistent with the equilibrium.
Step 2: Compute the decision rules 11;t+1 = g1(11;t; 22;t; Xt),
22;t+1 = g2(11;t; 22;t; Xt), Xt+1 = g3(11;t; 22;t; Xt; t+1), Yt = g4(11;t; 22;t; Xt) up
to second order around the steady-state. The decision rules are computed using
methods from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). In order to apply their methods,
I add a small quadratic adjustment cost for changing the portfolio from its steady-
state. However, we do not know whether the steady-state portfolio 0 we guessed is
the same as the average equilibrium portfolio in the true stochastic economy.
Step 3: Simulate the model for a large number of periods using the computed de-
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cision rules from Step 2. Compare the average portfolio shares with the steady-state
portfolio. If they are di¤erent, then we update the steady-state portfolio with the av-
erage portfolio and return to Step 2. If the di¤erence between them is within a certain
tolerance level, then that means the initial steady-state 0 is a good approximation
of the long run portfolio holdings and we take it as the solution to our model.
This algorithm is tested in Heathcote and Perri (2009) by comparing it to the
model solution where the analytical form of the portfolio is known. The comparison
shows that this algorithm gives a good approximation to the model and enjoys a rapid
convergence.
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3.7.3 Data
The data series come from the OECD Quarterly National Accounts (QNA). For the
US, GDP, consumption and investment correspond to Gross Domestic Product, Pri-
vate plus Government Final Consumption Expenditure and Gross Fixed Capital For-
mation (all at constant prices). The employment data, coming from OECD Main
Economic Indicators, use the (deseasonalized) civilian employment index series. The
imports and exports series at constant prices are from OECD Quarterly National
Accounts.
For the data of rest of the world, we construct an aggregate of Canada, Japan
and 19 European countries. The 19 European countries include Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United
Kingdom. For GDP, consumption and investment, I aggregate all the countries to
create a single ctional non-US country by rst rebasing each series in 2005 national
currency constant prices and then expressing everything in 2005 US dollars using
PPP exchange rates.
Employment for the rest of the world is aggregated using constant weights that
are porportional to the number of employed persons in each area in 2005. An em-
ployment series for the 19 European countries is not available before 2001; therefore
I use employment for Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom between 1984:1 and 2000:4.
For the period 1972:1 to 1983:4, I use aggregated employment data from the same
set of countries between 1984:1 and 2000:4 except Portugal. For the period 1962:1 to
1971:4, I use aggregated data from Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. These were the only European countries for which I could nd consistent
and comparable employment series.
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3.7.4 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Description Value
 inverse of IES 2
!I controls investors discount factor 0.112
!S controls savers discount factor 0.039
 controls elasticity of labor supply 0.6
1 capital share of market production 0.29
2 capital share of home production 0.40
 I controls level of investors labor 3.08
 S controls level of savers labor 1.32
 share of market good consumption 0.57
e controls ES between home and market good 0.9
 depreciation 0.025
 invesment adjustment cost 0.25
 controls variance of risk of holding foreign capital 0.14
n measure of investors 0.5
 controls leverage ratio 2/3
Note: The rst column shows the parameters that need to be calibrated. The
second column describes the parameters and the last column shows the calibrated
values for the parameters.
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Table 3.2: Model Moments - Benchmark Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Data Unconstrained Constrained Constrained
25% Foreign Exposure 86% Foreign Exposure
(A) Standard Deviation in %
Output 2.06 2.54 1.92 1.78
Net Export 0.39 0.29 0.17 0.16
(B) Standard Deviation relative to Ouput
Consumption 0.63 1.07 1.05 0.99
Investment 2.82 0.59 0.77 0.77
Labor 0.67 0.73 0.72 0.71
(C) Cross Correlation with Output
Consumption 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.98
Labor 0.86 1 1 1
Investment 0.95 0.84 0.76 0.96
Net Export -0.45 0.60 0.53 0.46
(D) Cross-Country Correlations
Consumption 0.44 0.29 0.53 0.75
Output 0.61 0.24 0.40 0.53
Investment 0.46 0.82 0.64 0.30
Labor 0.43 0.23 0.41 0.55
Note: The rst column shows the statistics calculated from the data. Panels (A), (B) and (C)
are calculated from US time series for the period 1972:1 to 2008:4. The statistics from panel (D)
represent the correlation of US series with series from the rest of the industrial world. The third
column, "Model 2," is the benchmark model. The second column, "Model 1," is the same as
Model 2 except that the investor does not face the leverage constraint. The last column, "Model
3," is the same as Model 2 except that the investors have more exposure to foreign capital.
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis - Adjustment Cost
Benchmark Model Sensitivity Test
Data  = 0:25  = 0:5  = 100
(A) Standard Deviation in %
Output 2.06 1.92 2.04 2.41
Net Export 0.39 0.17 0.25 0.34
(B) Standard Deviation relative to Ouput
Consumption 0.63 1.05 1.10 1.21
Investment 2.82 0.77 0.49 0.00
Labor 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.73
(C) Cross Correlation with Output
Consumption 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.99
Labor 0.86 1 1 1
Investment 0.95 0.76 0.77 0.80
Net Export -0.45 0.53 0.50 0.42
(D) Cross-Country Correlations
Consumption 0.44 0.53 0.61 0.78
Output 0.61 0.40 0.46 0.62
Investment 0.46 0.64 0.79 0.93
Labor 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.63
Note: The rst column shows the statistics calculated from the data. The
second column is the benchmark model. The last two columns are for dif-
ferent values of the investment adjustment cost.
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis - Leverage and Shocks
Data Benchmark Model Sensitivity Test
High Leverage BKK
(A) Standard Deviation in %
Output 2.06 1.92 2.31 1.67
Net Export 0.39 0.17 0.23 0.30
(B) Standard Deviation relative to Ouput
Consumption 0.63 1.05 1.13 1.13
Investment 2.82 0.77 0.57 0.45
Labor 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.70
(C) Cross Correlation with Output
Consumption 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.98
Labor 0.86 1 1 1
Investment 0.95 0.76 0.77 0.72
Net Export -0.45 0.53 0.50 0.57
(D) Cross-Country Correlations
Consumption 0.44 0.53 0.59 0.63
Output 0.61 0.40 0.46 0.34
Investment 0.46 0.64 0.72 0.58
Labor 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.32
Note: The rst column shows the statistics calculated from the data. The second
column is the benchmark model. The third column is the model with a leverage
ratio of 5. The last column is the model with the technology process from Backus,
Kehoe and Kydland (1992).
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Table 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis - IE of Goods
Benchmark Model Sensitivity Test
Data e = 0:9 e = 0:5 e = 0:1
(A) Standard Deviation in %
Output 2.06 1.92 1.55 1.45
Net Export 0.39 0.17 0.21 0.22
(B) Standard Deviation relative to Ouput
Consumption 0.63 1.05 0.88 0.83
Investment 2.82 0.77 0.98 1.05
Labor 0.67 0.72 0.57 0.52
(C) Cross Correlation with Output
Consumption 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.99
Labor 0.86 1 1 0.99
Investment 0.95 0.76 0.84 0.85
Net Export -0.45 0.53 0.56 0.57
(D) Cross-Country Correlations
Consumption 0.44 0.53 0.49 0.48
Output 0.61 0.40 0.34 0.32
Investment 0.46 0.64 0.72 0.73
Labor 0.43 0.41 0.28 0.23
Note: The rst column shows the statistics calculated from the data. The
second column is the benchmark model. The last two columns are for dif-
ferent values of elasticity of substitution between home and market goods.
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